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Abstract
The rise ofthe textile and apparelglobal value chains and trade preftrences has created unprecedented opportunitiesfor developing countries to participate in trade in textiles and apparel. Yet,
while some countries have managed to build backward linkages and engage in industrialupgrading, others remain locked in the lower echelons of the textile and apparel value chain.
This Article demonstrates that trade preftrences and rules of origin alone do not explain countries' diverging experiences in the apparel value chain. Rather, a country's industrialpolicy is
crucial in determining sustainablegrowth: is it solely export-oriented, or does it balancepromoting
growth of Foreign Direct Investment with encouraging the development of a parallel domestic
industry?
This Article demonstrates the key role of indutrialpolicy by engaging in a qualitative analysisof
the experiences of six developing countries in integratinginto the textile and apparel global value
chain: Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. Based on the successes and the failures of the countries studied, this Article ends by providing specific policy options
fir a balanced industrialpolicy, at a national, regional and internationallevel.
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Introduction
Trade preferences, compounded by the geographic fragmentation of production, have
created unprecedented opportunities for developing countries to increase their participation in international trade and grow their economies. In particular, trade preferences have
played a central role in increasing developing countries' participation in textile and apparel manufacturing.' These products typically face some of the highest tariffs on manufactured goods, with the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff for textiles averaging 5.7
percent for the European Union and 7.5 percent for the United States, and 11.5 percent
and 11.4 percent, respectively, for apparel products. 2 Trade preferences schemes have
eliminated or significantly reduced these tariffs for eligible countries, facilitating developing countries to sell their garment exports globally.
Yet despite these preference-enabled opportunities, developing countries' experiences
with international trade in the textile and apparel sector have been mixed at various levels.
First, while a handful of developing countries has been able to take advantage of trade
preferences by significantly increasing export volumes of specific products, other countries
have not similarly benefited from preferential market access. Second, while preferences in
specific industrial sectors like apparel have enabled economic growth, most growth has
been ephemeral, spurred by foreign investment and rent seeking. Few developing countries have succeeded in translating preference-generated market access in apparel into a
sustainable comparative advantage through skill transfer, upgrading in product sophistication and market diversification to "attain a level of competitiveness which make [preference-receiving countries] self-supporting economically and full partners in international
3
trade."
The international community has mainly, if not exclusively, responded to the first trade
preference challenge: the lack of coverage and/or utilization of trade preference programs.4 In this regard, its response has been to advocate for expansion, enhancement and
extensions of trade preference programs, and in particular, to liberalize restrictive rules of
origin (ROOs).1 Expanding coverage of preference programs and relaxing ROOs is crucial and will most certainly increase preference-receiving countries' export volumes. Nevertheless, it does not automatically address the second challenge, i.e., encouraging
sustainable economic development in the preference-receiving country. Indeed, the inter1. Stacey Frederick & Cornelia Staritz, Developments in the GlobalApparel Industiy after the MFA Phaseout,
in SEWING SUCCEss? EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND POVERTY FOLLOWING THE END OF THE MULTI-FIBRE

41, 54 (Gladys Lopez-Acevedo & Raymond Robertson eds., 2012), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPOVERTY/Resources/SewingSuccessFullReport.pdf
2. Id.
3. Developing Countries, International Trade and Sustainable Development: The Function of the Community's
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for the Ten Year Periodfrom 2006 to 2015, at 3, COM (2004) 461 final
(july 7, 2004), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC04
61&from=EN.
4. See id.
5. This position has been advocated particularly forcefully in the apparel and textile sector, where there is
strong evidence that preferences accompanied with liberal ROOs have increased trade volumes; see VIVIAN C.
JONES, CONG. RESE. SERv., RL34524, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: RULES OF ORGI
(2015); see e.g., 15 Senatos Ask the President to Seek Flexible Rules on Apparel in the TPPAgreement, RETAIL INDUs. LEADERS AsS'N
(May 1, 2012), http://www.rila.org/news/topnews/2012newsreleases/Pages/15-Senators-Ask-the-Presidentto-Seek-Flexible-Rules-on-Apparel-in-the-TPP-Agreement.aspx.
ARRANGEMENT
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national community's focus on expanding trade through preference programs is based on
the common, yet mistaken, assumption "that wealthy nations can materially shape development in the poor world, and that their efforts to do so should consist largely of provid6
ing . . . resources to and trading opportunities for poor countries."
We need to start thinking about trade policy and international development differently.
Rather than equating export volume and short-term GDP growth with economic development, it is imperative to analyze whether a country has actually embarked on a path of
sustainable economic development. This means that we need to start asking different
questions. For example, in addition to asking how to expand coverage of the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), or how to reduce restrictive ROOs, we also need
to be asking questions such as: "How can preference-receiving countries benefit from increased market opportunities yet prevent preference-and market-dependency?" "What
are the reasons that most factories in Cambodia are foreign owned while Sri Lanka's apparel and industry is mainly locally owned?" or "Why has Bangladesh been able to set up a
textile base, while other countries still import nearly all garment inputs?"
Answering these questions warrants an approach that looks beyond the confines of the
international trade preferences framework and analyzes the extent to which preferencereceiving domestic policy measures have enabled or constrained sustainable economic
growth. Such policy interventions that alter a society's industrial structure are known by
the unpopular term "industrial policy." Yet the meaning of "industrial policy" continues
to evolve and is no longer just associated with traditional market failure and protectionist
concepts. Indeed, it now typically encompasses "interventions that help build systems,
create networks, develop institutions and align strategic priorities."7 When using the term
industrial policy, this Article refers to this dynamic, evolving definition, focusing on different governmental interventions that maximize sustainable economic growth. This includes measures aimed at diversifying production within the apparel sector, incentivizing
linkages between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and local businesses, and creating specifically targeted training programs.
This Article analyzes how developing countries already active in the textile and apparel
value chain can maximize developmental benefits in this sector. The choice to focus exclusively on trade in apparel has been made for several reasons. First, because traditionally
apparel and textile products were subjected to high tariffs, the effects of trade preference
programs and its accompanying ROOs have been particularly pronounced in this sector.
As a result, this sector lends itself to a great overview of both the potential and limits of
preferences on sustainable economic growth. Second, apparel is one of the oldest and
largest export industries in the world and is often the "starter" industry in developing
countries. 8 Textile production-while more capital intensive than apparel and often absent in developing countries-is intrinsically linked to apparel production and is therefore,
where is relevant, and included in this analysis.

6. Nancy Birdsall, Dan Rodrik, & Arvind Subramanian, How to Help Poor Countries, 84 FOREIGN AFFs.
136 (2005).
7. Ken Warwick, Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New trends, 2 OECD Sci.,

TECH. AND IN-

DUS. POLY PAPERS (2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5 k4869clwOxp.pdf expires= 14

46221734&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4D35924297886E4FAA09Al67156C45C6.
8. Id. at 1.

SUMMER 2015

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
52

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

This Article does not assess whether developing countries have made the correct choice
to focus on the development of their textile and apparel sector in the first place. Indeed,
this Article recognizes that the sustainable development of textile and garment industry
may not always be a worthy goal in any given country, given the opportunity costs of
pursuing industrial policy in that area. That would be inherently a question for economists to address. 9 Instead, this Article focuses exclusively on how developing countries
that have already decided to focus on their textile and apparel industry can turn what is
often ephemeral growth into sustainable development linkages.
Central to this Article are the experiences of six developing countries: Lesotho, Kenya,
Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. These countries were chosen because
they all experienced a significant increase in their textile and/or apparel export volume
during the last decade(s), mainly because of trade preferences compounded by the MultiFiber Agreement (MFA), which spurred foreign investment in the garment sector in these
countries. Despite these initial similarities, however, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Madagascar have been relatively successful in creating sustainable industrial growth, whereas preference-induced growth in Kenya, Cambodia, and Lesotho has been more ephemeral.
These different paths of industrial development are due to a myriad of factors, including
different levels of foreign investors' embeddedness in the host country, regional integration, and most importantly, different choices in industrial policy. Developing country
governments that have adopted industrial policies that are solely export-oriented-e.g.
through establishing export processing zones (EPZs) but not extending certain EPZ-specific benefits to local producers-have generally failed to generate sustainable growth in
the apparel sector, whereas governments that adopted a balanced industrial policy aiming
both to attract foreign investors to build up an export-oriented industry while providing
incentives for domestic firms to engage in the apparel industry-e.g. through policies that
encourage and require foreign investors to partner with local business-have generally
experienced more sustainable growth.
Based on these case studies, this Article outlines policy options for governments interested in adopting a more balanced approach to growing their apparel industry. At a national level, governments can encourage local production by lowering entry barriers for
entrepreneurs, providing special skills training, equalizing incentives for domestic and foreign enterprises, and promoting joint ventures and other collaboration between foreign
and national businesses through tools such as tax benefits and limits on the percentage of
foreign ownership. A balanced industrial policy should also encourage the creation of
backward linkages, either locally or regionally. This can be done through input subsidies
such as local-sourcing initiatives, or, where relevant, through regional coordinating industry bodies. Additionally, governments can help the industry move up the value chain by
stimulating product upgrading and the development of niche products. Skill training for
integrated/upward development, product promotion organizations and branding, and investment all contribute to this goal. The case studies also highlight the critical importance of strengthening regional market integration. One way to do so would be through
lowering import and tariffs on apparel and textile at the regional level, e.g. the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union
9. See e.g.,

RICARDo HALTSMANN ET AL., ATLAS ON EcONOMIC

COMPLEXITY:

PROSPERITY (2014).
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(SACU), or to have more flexible ROOs. At a minimum, the same incentives provided for
exporting outside of regional blocs should be offered to intra-regional trade.
Keeping these lessons in mind, the international community should move the focus of
its trade and development dialogue away from increasing trade volumes and GDP towards
encouraging the build-up of local industry through balanced industrial policy. Concretely, it could do so by consulting governments of preference-receiving countries on
how to strategically use trade preferences given the country's endowments and industrial
capabilities. It should also be explored how industrial policy goals can be taken into account in future trade agreements.
Above all, this Article demonstrates the importance for preference-receiving countries
to begin thinking strategically with an eye to long-lasting sustainable growth. Trade preferences ought to merely be an enabling factor to unlock a country's potential for sustainable economic growth; not the dominant feature of a country's economic development.

I.

Structure

This Article is divided in five parts. First, it situates trade preferences within the ideological debate between liberalism and protectionism and reviews the evolution and legal
underpinnings of trade preference regimes. Second, it discusses the history and characteristics of the textile and apparel value chain, highlighting the regulatory context and in
particular the European Union's and the United States' trade preference programs that
have been instrumental in expanding apparel exports in the countries studied. Third, it
contains six case studies of the countries on which this Article is based: Lesotho, Kenya,
Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Cambodia, and analyzes whether these countries
have been able to build up a sustainable apparel and textile industry. Fourth, based on
these case studies, it summarizes the factors that have proven critical in determining industrial sustainability in the trade and apparel sector. Fifth and finally, it sets out national
policy options for countries looking to engage in balanced industrial policy, and provides
recommendations for regional and international levels.

II.

Scope

As mentioned above, this Article focuses exclusively on how to develop long-term sustainability in the textile and apparel value chain. This means that while some of the recommendations are likely to be relevant in creating long-term sustainability across sectors,
this Article does not explore and/or extrapolate the applicability of its policy recommendations beyond the textile and apparel value chain.
Moreover, this Article focuses exclusively on maximizing economic sustainability.
Thus, issues directly concerning social sustainability, e.g., human rights, wages, labor conditions, and safety measures, are beyond the scope of this Article. While the ultimate aim
of the approach discussed is to improve the lives of those living and working in developing
countries, this Article operates on the underlying assumption that building sustainablelocal
industries-which involves creating sustainable employment, skill development, wage increases and value-added-correlates with improving a country's social conditions.
Factors related to economic competitiveness and competitive advantage other than
trade preferences are similarly beyond the scope of this Article. For example, this Article
SUMMER 2015
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does not focus on labor costs, infrastructural context, efficiency, taxes, corruption, market
proximity, and other factors companies typically look for when making outsourcing decisions. While critically important for developing countries' ability to participate in the
trade and apparel value chain and attract foreign investment, the focus of this Article is on
what happens after a developing country has successfully attracted foreign investment and
is able to expand its apparel exports under a trade preference scheme. That said, should
developing countries decide to alter their industrial policies, including through changing
the terms of foreign investment, this may influence a country's ability to continue to attract foreign investment. The delicate and important balance of getting industrial policy
and investment incentives right will be discussed below.
The analysis in this Article is limited to six developing countries: Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia. These countries were chosen since they
are (mostly) all situated at the receiving end of outsourcing-in contrast to the industry's
main producers like Korea, Taiwan, and China. These Asian powerhouses operate at the
top of the value chain, do not qualify for trade preferences, and face different legal obstacles. As such, an analysis of industrial sustainability and corresponding policy options for
these countries will necessarily be different than for developing countries occupying lower
echelons in the value chain. Consequently, the recommendations provided in this Article
do not apply to these countries. Similarly, while some of these high-performing Asian
countries are still considered developing countries, this Article's use of the term "developing country" will refer solely to low-income countries that are still mainly at the receiving
end of the trade and apparel value chain.
Finally, this analysis is geographically limited to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia,
and South East Asia. Latin America, Middle America, and Eastern Europe, which each
have significant textile and apparel industries, fall outside the scope of this analysis like
NAFTA, some of the excluded countries receive special trade preferences when exporting
to the United States and the European Union. This would add an additional lawyer of
complexity to an already complex analysis and is therefore excluded from the scope of this
Article.

III.
A.

Background
TRADE PREFERENCES:

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is built on the premise that a reduction in trade
barriers accelerates economic growth. At the core of its workings lie the principles of
non-discrimination and reciprocity. At the same time, WTO Members recognize that
open market policies may not automatically lead to economic gains in countries that
lagged behind from the start; i.e. developing countries with only nascent industrial development. As such, the WTO has adopted different provisions that facilitate developingcountry growth by allowing developing countries to be treated more favorably than other
Member States. This is known as special and differential treatment.' 0
10.

See

JEANNE

J.

GuMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERv.,

RS22183,

TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOP-

ING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 1 (2011), available at http://fas.org/sgp/

crs/misc/RS22183.pdf.
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In 1965, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was amended to recognize the special economic needs of developing countries and establish the non-reciprocity
principle." In 1968, UNCTAD established the Generalized System of Preferences, the
framework to provide such preferences to developing countries. 12 The non-reciprocity
principle is in tension with the Most Favored Nation concept of GATT Article I, the
Parties adopted an MEN waiver in 1971 for the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), which allowed for developed countries to extent favorable tariff treatment to developing countries. 3 As a result, in 1979 the Parties adopted the Enabling Clause, obfuscating the need for a waiver for GSP Programs that fall within the scope of the Enabling
Clause.14 The Enabling Clause, which continues to apply as part of the GATT 1994,
provides that:
Notwithstanding the [MFN] provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing
countries without according such treatment to other contracting parties."
The provisions of the Enabling Clause apply to four specific situations: (1) preferential
tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with GSP; (2) differential and more favorable treatment
concerning non-tariff measures; (3) regional or global arrangements entered into amongst
less-developed contracting parties for mutual reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers;
and, (4) special treatment for the least developed among the developing countries in the
context of any general or specific measures in favor of developing countries.1 6 Thus, per
the Enabling Clause, all preference programs that fall within its scope are legitimate under
the VTO. The Enabling Clause also makes clear that trade preferences are not a right
but rather a privilege, specifying that "contracting parties may accord differential and
more favorable treatment."1 7 Other provisions specify that preferences are unilateral, i.e.
they do not require reciprocity.'8
For preference programs that fall outside the scope of the Enabling Clause, waivers may
be obtained from specific GATT obligations, which are permitted through GATT Article
IX:3. The preference programs addressed in this Article other than GSP (which covers
the EU's "Everything but Arms" (EBA) program) have been established through waivers
11. Id.
12. About GSP, U.N. CoN'. ON TRADE & DEv. [UNCTAD], http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/
About-GSP.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
13. Id.
14. Bernard Hoekman & Caglar Ozden, Trade Preferences and DifferentialTreatment ofDeveloping Countries:
A Selective Survey 6 (World Bank Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 3566, 2005), available at, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/04/21/000012009_200504211244
42/Rendered/PDF/wps3566.pdf. In addition to Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs, the enabling clause covers multilateral nontariff preferences negotiated under GATT. Grimmet, supra note 10, at
1-2. Multilateral arrangements among less developed countries and special treatment of least developed
countries in the context of any general or specific measure in favor of developing countries.
15. GATT Contracting Parties, Differentialand More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller ParticIpation ofDeveloping Countries [Enabling Clause], L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT BISD (26th Supp.), at 191, 191
(1979).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 192.
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rather than through the Enabling Clause. This includes AGOA and the Cotonou Agreement (which was preceded by the Lom6 Convention).1 9 The European's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) establish preferences not on the basis of waivers or the
enabling clause, but rather as part of free trade agreements.
B.

PROTECTIONISM, LIBERALISM, AND TRADE PREFERENCES

Since the beginning of the post-colonial era in the 1950s, development economists and
scholars have engaged in ideologically-driven debates regarding which trade policies
would be most effective in creating economic growth in developing countries: protectionist measures that focus on the development of domestic infant industries prior to openingup to foreign markets-also known as import substitution industrialization (ISI)-or export-oriented industrialization (EOI) that facilitates market integration into the global
economy. 20 ISI advocates adhere to the general idea that in order for developing countries to grow sustainably, they have to reduce import dependency and diversify their export market. 2 1 The main way to do this is through an active industrial policy that
encourages investments in non-traditional manufacturing industries through a combination of subsidies, high import tariffs, overvalued currency and barriers to ED. 22 In contrast, adherents of EOI believe that trade in goods in which a country enjoys a
comparative advantage accelerates economic growth and leads to greater levels of development. 23 As such, EOI's advocates typically endorse policies that focus on opening borders
through tariff reductions, subsidies for export-oriented industries, and attracting ED.24
While in the 1950s many developing countries opted for the ISI paradigm, the exportoriented strategies gained favor in the 1970s. 25 This shift occurred as a result of a myriad
of factors, notably the powerful export-oriented counter-narrative provided by the "East
Asian miracle," debt servicing problems experienced by ISI countries due to the oil crisis
26
of the 1970s, and pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
In addition to a shift in development policies, these changes led to an equally transformative shift in production strategies of transnational corporations. 27 An increase in industrial
capabilities in developing countries triggered the geographic fragmentation of production
to countries offering lower production costs, leading to the emergence of global value
29
28
This trend accelerated the shift from ISI to EOI in developing countries.
chains.
19. For a detailed overview of the preferences addressed in this paper, please refer to Section V.B.
20. Ujal Singh Bhatia, The Globalization of Supply Chains: Policy Challenges for Developing Countries, in
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD 313, 315 (Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low eds., 2013).
21. Hoekman & Ozden, supra note 14, at 1.
22. Import Substitution Industrialization, WIKIPEDIA (last modified Sept. 3, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/Import-substitudon industrializadon#Theoreticalbasis.
23. Export-Oriented Industrialization,WIKIPEDIA (last modified Jan. 2, 2015, 1:25 PM), http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Export-orientedindustrialization.
24. Id.
25. Ozlem Onaran & Englebert Stockhammer, Two Different Export-Oriented Growth Strategies under a
Wage-ledAccumulation Regime, (Pol. Econ. Research Inst. Working Paper No. 38, 2001).
26. Bhatia, supra note 20, at 315.
27. Gary Gereffi & Timothy Sturgeon, Global Value Chains and IndustrialPolicy: The Role ofEmerging Economies, in GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD 329, 329-330 (Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low
eds., 2013).
28. Id.
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Open market policies thus became the norm, and remedies to poorly performing developing economies are these days generally sought in expanding market access through trade
preferences.
Both ISI and EOI adherents have supported trade preferences, although they are generally associated with those in favor of open markets. 30 During the 1950s and early 1960s,
protectionists supported special and differential treatment as such treatment allowed developing countries to keep up high trade barriers to protect their infant industries while
being able to export to other countries. 31 This was deemed necessary to foster industrial
capacity in non-traditional manufacturers.32 At the same time, EOI adherents supported
trade preferences as this would result in an increase in exports, enabling countries to accumulate foreign exchange and capture economies of scale.33 Trade preferences could also
lead to increased product sophistication in developing countries, and diversify both products and markets to the extent that a developing country would no longer require trade
preferences to be competitive internationally. 34 Finally, it was believed that gains from
trade preferences would spread to the rest of a country's economy through backward and
35
forward linkages that result from exports input demands.
But trade preference programs have not always delivered. Indeed, the dominant view in
the literature is that trade preferences are at best a marginal tool for development.36 This
is in part due to the limited coverage of most preference programs. While they have
multiplied in recent years, they are often limited in scope. For example, some preference
programs are limited to a certain geographic area (e.g., AGOA), products (textile and
apparel products are typically excluded from GSP programs), and duration. More importantly, an eligible developing country can only take full advantage of preference benefits if
it can demonstrate that an exported product meets the rules of origins (ROOs) requirements-conditions imposed on products in order for the product to be considered to
originate within a specific country. ROOs stipulate the level of processing or value-added
that must take place in a given country for a product to be considered to originate in that
country.37 This can be either a percentage of the total value of product (e.g., a minimum
of 40% of value-added) or a number of production steps that have to be undertaken in the
developing country (e.g., for textile and apparel, a requirement that the spinning of yarn
and manufacturing takes place in the country). Given that developing countries mostly
engage in value-added activities in the lowest segments of the value chain, they often do
not have the capability to meet the minimum value-added or transformational require29. Id.
30. What is the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm (last visited
Dec. 3, 2015).
31. Hoekman & Ozden, supra note 14, at 1.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Lawrence Edwards & Robert Z. Lawrence, AGOA Rules: The Intended and Unintended Consequences of
Special Fabric Provisions, at 4 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 16623, 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6623.pdf.
35. Id.
36. For an extensive literature review on trade preferences, please see Hoekman & Ozden, supra note 14.
37. CAROLINA BJUGGREN & ELENOR HANSON LUNDSTROM, SWEDISH NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE
[SNBT], THE IMPACT OF RULES OF ORIGIN ON TRADE: A COMPARISON OF THE EU'S AND THE US's

6-8 (2012), available at http://www.kommers.se/Documents/dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2012/skriftserien/report-the-impact-of-rules-of-orgin-on-trade.pdf
RULES FOR THE TEXTILE AND CLOTHING SECTOR
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ments. As a result, strict ROOs requirements reduce the efficacy of preference programs,
especially in small countries where local sourcing is either limited or non-existent.3 8
Other limits that scholars have pointed out include preference erosion. Over the last
decade(s), import tariffs have significantly declined, both through reductions in MEN
rates and through a surge in regional and mega-regional trade agreements. This means
that for most products, tariffs no longer constitute a major market access barrier. And for
products like apparel that continue to be subject to high import tariffs, the preference
margin shrinks as more countries are eligible for reduced or zero tariffs. This will reduce
the overall effect of trade of preference programs.
Given these limitations, reform efforts focus largely on how to further expand the scope
of trade preferences. Particular focus has been placed on reform through more flexible
ROOs. For example, the Center for Global Development recommends to "change program rules that raise costs and impede market access for Least Developed Countries
(LDCs), especially rules of origin restricting input sourcing"; 39 and a World Bank publication states that "restrictive rules of origin constrain international specialization and discriminate against small, low-income countries, where the possibility for local sourcing are
limited."40 The OECD argues for harmonization, simplification, and relaxation of the
rules of origin in Trade Preferences For Development (TPFD) schemes; 4 1 Tony Blair's
42
Commission for Africa calls on rich countries to tear down "finicky rules of origin."
Condon and Stern consider that:
The evidence strongly indicates that the liberal rules of origin on apparel exports
from LDCs have been instrumental in explaining the surge in apparel exports to the
U.S. under AGOA. Conversely, the evidence suggests that restrictive rules of origin
on apparel exports from non-LDCs and the general rules of origin on non-apparel
items have impeded the potential gains from AGOA.43
A recent review of AGOA by the EPPI Centre of the University of London highlights
that:
It is important that AGOA preferences cover all products. Tariffs on products excluded from AGOA ... remain high and AGOA's broader economic impact could be
improved if preferences were extended to all products. Equally, products which are
currently subject to tariff rate quotas should be fully liberalised. Consideration also
needs to be given to making AGOA preferences permanent. These measures need to
38. PAUL BRENTON

&

CAGLAR OZDEN, WORLD BANK TRADE & DEv. RESEARCH GRP., TRADE PREFER-

(2006), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-1235150721870/chl0
BrentonOzdenApparelPreferences.pdf.
39. KIMBERLEY ANN ELLIOTT, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEv., OPEN MARKETS FOR THE POOREST COUNTRIES 1 (2010), available at http://www.cgdev.org/files/1423918_fileOpenMarketsFinal.pdf.
40. Paul Brenton, PreferentialRules of Origin, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 161, 175 Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds., 2001).
41. Olivier Cadot & Jaime de Melo, Why OECD Countries Should Reform Rules of Origin, 23 WORLD BANK
ENCES FOR APPAREL AND THE ROLE OF RULES OF ORIGIN: THE CASE OF AFRICA 21

RES. OBSERVER 77

(2008).

42. Tony Blair's Commission forAfica: Erasing the Scar, EcONOMIST (Mar. 11, 2005), http://www.economist

.com/node/3751 118.

43.

NIALL

CONDON

&

MATTHEW STERN, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AGOA IN INCREASING TRADE FROM

LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIEs: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEw

43 (2011).
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be coupled with non-restrictive rules of origin which will allow exporters in LDCs
the flexibility to freely source inputs and exploit their comparative advantage in la44
bour intensive products.
Professors Jamie de Melo and Alberto Portugal-Perez equally provide that:
Development-friendly policies consistent with the spirit of granting preferential access to low-income countries would benefit from relaxing the stringency of rules of
4
origin requirements.
General dissatisfaction with the narrow scope and coverage of ROOs permit endless
tinkering and has generated a debate focused on setting preferences rules just right. But
this debate diverts attention from the more decisive role played by developing countries'
domestic policy in generating sustainable industrial growth. While preferences are crucial
to development as they provide developing countries unique opportunities to participate
in international value chains, they are not, by themselves, sufficient if the aim is to generate sustainable industrial development.
While this restates the obvious, the brief overview above demonstrates that development reform efforts continue to be approached through the narrow lens of trade preference reform, without taking into account the more decisive role of a preference-receiving
country's domestic policies. Indeed, as the next sections will demonstrate, industrial policy is often forgotten in the development-through-trade dialogue.
Thus, this Article differs from the dominant literature as it moves away from a fixation
on trade preferences as an all-encompassing, determinative instrument to the policy tools
preference-receiving governments can use to maximize local economic benefits generated
through preference-induced trade opportunities. Simply increasing utilization rates and
decreasing preference-related uncertainty, while important, does not automatically generate viable, self-sustaining economies.

IV.
A.

The Textile and Apparel Value Chain
THE RISE OF THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN

During the last few decades, the textile and apparel industry has undergone major geographical shifts. During the 1950-60s, Western Europe and North American clothing
production was displaced by an influx of imports from Japan. 46 Subsequently, clothing
and textile production shifted to the "Big Three": Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea,
which dominated the industry in the 1970s and 1980s. 47 A third major shift took place in
the late 1980s and 1990s, from the Big Three to other developing countries including
44. Id. at 3.
45. Jaime de Melo & Alberto Portugal-Perez, The US Afican Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA): Preferences
for African Countries That Do Not Deny Market Access, VOX (May 29, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/aricle/
trade-preferences-do-not-deny-market-access.

46.

GARY GEREFFI &

OLGA MEMEDOVIC,

U.N.

INDUS. DEv. ORG., THE GLOBAL APPAREL VALUE

COUNTRIES 8-9 (2003), available at
www.urnido.org/fileadmin/media/documents/pdf/ServicesModules/Apparel-Value-Chain.pdf.
47. Id. at 8-9.

CHAIN: WHAT PROSPECTS FOR UPGRADING BY DEVELOPING
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China and Southeast Asia (including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines)
48
and also during the late 1990s to South Asia and Latin America.
The rise of Global Value Chains (GVCs) in textile and apparel has led to major geographical shifts in the production of textile and apparel, providing opportunities to devel49
Whereas in the mid-1960s
oping countries to participate in international trade.
developing countries accounted only for around 25 percent of exports in textile and apparel, by 2000 this share had risen to over 70 percent. 0 The participation of developing
countries also led to an increase in the total value of apparel exports. Between 2005 and
2011, apparel exports rose 48 percent to a total value of $412 billion in 2011, 58 percent of
which is comprised of developing countries, with Asian suppliers accounting for 52 percent in 2011 (China has 37 percent, Bangladesh 4.8 percent, India 3.5 percent)."
The Textile and Apparel GVC is a typical example of a buyer-driven value chain, in
which lead firms in developed countries or emerging markets set the terms by which developing countries can participate.5 2 Lead firms control most value-added activities like
design and branding but, motivated by cost-reductions, outsource most of the manufacturing process to developing countries.5 3 As illustrated in Figure 1 below, the Textile and
Apparel GVC consists of roughly four main production stages: (1) the supply of raw material (natural and synthetic) to textile companies; (2) the production and finishing of yarn
by textile companies; (3) apparel production in garment factories; and (4) distribution and
4
sales channels at the wholesale and retail level.

48. Id.
49. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 43.
50. Id. at 43.

51.

TAKAHIRO FUKUNISHI ET AL., AID FOR

TRADE

AND VALUE CHAINS N

TEXTILES AND

APPAREL 5, 13

&

(2013),http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/AidforTradeSectorStudyTextiled.pdf.
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 22, 23.
54. Cornelia Staritz, Apparel Exports - Still a Path for Industrial Development? 5, 8-9 (O.F.S.E., Working
Paper No. 34, 2012), available at http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/98810/1/734851413.pdf; Gereffi
Memedovic, supra note 46, at 8-9.
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Given that most developing countries have a competitive advantage in cheap labor, they
typically enter the Textile and Apparel GVC in the third stage of the value chain: apparel
production.5 6 As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the apparel production phase is not only
the most labor intensive, but also the lowest in value-added, involving mainly sewing,
cutting, and finishing activities, which are also known as "Cut-Make-Trim" (CMT).

55. Gary Gereffi & Stacey Frederick, The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade and the Crisis: Challenges and
Opportunitiesfor Developing Countries, in GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A POST CRISIs WORLD 157-208 (Olivier
Cattaneo et al. eds., 2010) (cited in Staritz, supra note 54, at 6-7).
56. Staritz, spra note 54, at 5.
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Figure

257

Some developing countries manage to establish downstream linkages into the more capital and scale intensive textile sector, thereby increasing their developmental potential.58
There are other ways in which developing countries can move to more value-added
activities in the Textile and Apparel GVC, the most relevant of which are process and
product upgrading.59 "Process upgrading" refers to companies or countries improving
their position in the value chain by creating new production efficiencies, through improved technologies or organizational forms.60 "Product upgrading" occurs when a country begins to produce more complex goods that require more value-added, for example,
when a country moves from manufacturing to textile production.61 Upgrading within and
across the value chains can also happen.62 For example, individual producers can change
their function in the value chain by moving to higher value-added activities like branding
and marketing, or into entirely new value chains.63
Trade policy, especially tariffs and quotas, has played a prominent role in shaping the
textile and apparel global value chain.64 In 1974, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) was
negotiated, subjecting established trade and apparel suppliers to quota restrictions on textile and apparel imports into the United States and the European Union.65 As a result of
these quota restrictions, leading apparel producers (mostly from Hong Kong SAR, China,
57. Id. at 9.

58. Id. at 12.
59. Raphael Kaplinsky & WarnuWamnae, The Detrminant of Upgradingand Value Added in the African Clothing Sector: The ContrastingExperiences of Kenya and Maaacr15-19 (Open Univx, Working Paper No. 59,
2010), available at https://www.open.ac.uk/ikd/documents/working-papers/i kd-working-paper-59.pdf.
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 28.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 52.

65. Kaplinsky &Wamae, supra note 59, at 52, 53.
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Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 6 6) began outsourcing clothing assembly processes to low-in67
come countries in the Asian Pacific region and elsewhere that had unused MFA quotas.
In 1994, the MEA was replaced by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which
called for a phase-out of all quotas on trade in textile and apparel products by 2004.68
With the abolition of apparel quotas production could be sourced to any country, providing new opportunities for large, competitive garment suppliers like China and India while
exposing the vulnerability of low-income countries that had attracted FDI in part because
69
of these quotas.

B.

TRADE PREFERENCES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL
VALUE CHAIN

As mentioned earlier, trade preference schemes have significantly influenced trade flows
in the textile and apparel value chain, given that textile and apparel exports typically face
some of the highest tariffs on manufactured goods. This section provides a brief overview
of the main preference schemes that cover textile and apparel products from the six countries studied, with a focus on the two major export markets for apparel: Europe and the
United States.
The United States grants preferences to developing countries under its GSP program,
with special provisions for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).70 Most textile and apparel
imports are not eligible for GSP preferences, as only 6 percent of textile and apparel
goods from non-LDCs are covered,7 ' subject to demonstrating 35 percent of domestic
value-added, in addition to "substantial transformation." 72 For LDCs, the product coverage is slighter greater, but the ROOs requirements remain the same.
While few apparel and textile products are eligible for United States GSP preferences,
some regional agreements contain provisions that are specifically set up to increase textile
and apparel trade flows between developing countries and the United States.73 One of
these programs is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed in
2000, and recently extended until 2025. Under AGOA, eligible SSA countries receive
duty-free and quota-free treatment for a wider range of products than the products covered under GSP, including previously excluded textile and apparel.74 Until recently,
AGOA preferences were subject to a minimum local value-added of 35 percent.7 While
countries were allowed to use U.S.-origin and regional inputs to be counted towards this
66. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 53.
67. Gereffi & Frederick, supra note 55, at 158-59.
68. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 53.
69. Kenta Goto, Competitiveness and Decent Work in Global Value Chains: Substitutionary or Complementary?,
21 DEV. IN PRAC. 943, 946 (2011).
70. BJUGGREN & LUNDSTROM, spra note 37, at 25.
7 1. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 26.
74. Ralph Kaplinsky & Mike Morris, Do the Asian Drivers Undermine the Export-OrientedIndustrializationin
SSA?, 36 WORLD DEv. J. 254, 261 (2008), available at http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0305750X07002008/1-s2.0S0305750X07002008-main.pdftid=604e5d44-6315-1le5-bd59-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1443138096_bl314
3277993b7df04e9699906048ed5.
75. Id. at 261.
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requirement, still only few countries were able to take advantage of AGOA.7 6 As a result,
a special provision was added to AGOA, allowing AGOA-eligible SSA countries classified
as "lesser developed countries" to receive duty-free and quota free market access without
requiring a minimum percentage of local value-added.77 In other words, under AGOA,
LDCs in SSA are able to source their inputs from non-U.S. or non-AGOA members, and
still receive preferential treatment.
"third country fabric rule."

This is also called singled transformation, or the

78

Like the United States, the European Union has a general GSP preference scheme that
provides for duty reductions. Textile and apparel products, which are considered sensitive
products, are covered but receive less-favorable duty reductions compared to other products: "the MEN duty rate minus 20%."79 GSP-eligibility is different for LDCs and non80

LDCs.

For non-LDCs, eligibility is contingent upon a double-transformation require-

ment, which involves demonstrating that both sewing of fabric and an input production
process (e.g., knitting or weaving fabric) took place.81 Inputs from the European Union,
however, can be counted towards this requirement-also known as bilateral cumulationand in 2011, the rules were reformed to allow for regional cumulation as well.

82

For LDCs, single transformation rules apply, which means that a product made of nonregional and non-bilateral inputs can still qualify for GSP reductions. 83 Under GSP+,
duty-free access is available for "especially vulnerable" countries that qualify, which is
84

conditional on ratifying a select number of international conventions.

In 2001, the Eu-

ropean Union passed the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative, providing duty-free and
85

quota-free access to LDCs, covering all goods except for arms.

While initially double

transformation was required for textile and apparel goods, these rules were amended in
8 6
2011 to require only single transformation.
Until January 1, 2008, seventy-seven African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
received duty-free market access to the European Union under the Lom6 Conventionwhich later became known as the Cotonou Agreement-including for textile and apparel
products.

87

Similar to the GSP ROOs, preferential access was contingent upon double

transformation.88

However, it was easier to meet double transformation than under the

GSP, as full regional cumulation between all ACP countries was allowed.89 The Cotonou
Agreement was found to be VTO-inconsistent and expired in 2008, when it was supposed
to be replaced by bilateral trade agreements between the seventy-seven ACP countries and

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. BJUGGREN & LUNDSTROM, spra note 37, at 26.
79. Id. at 24.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. BJUGGREN & LUNDSTROM, spra note 37, at 23.
85. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 55.
86. BJ, supra note 24, at 24.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.; Lorand Bartels, The Trade and DevelopmentPolicy of the European Union, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 715, 749
(2007).
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these agreements were not finalized in
EPAs that provided for duty-free and
laxed the ROOs to allow for third
transformation.91

V.

65

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).9 0 As
time, a handful of countries/regions signed interim
quota-free access to the European Union, and recountry fabric imports and require only single

Case Studies

Before engaging in the case studies, it is important to clarify the term "sustainable economic growth" as it is used in this Article. While generally this term refers to socially or
environmentally sustainable growth, in this Article it reflects exclusively the extent to
which a developing country has been able to generate local industrial development that
minimizes dependency on external factors, including changes in global demand for apparel or trade preference programs. In other words, when using the terms "sustainable
economic development" this Article is looking into the question of whether countries have
built up comparative advantages such that their industry can be competitive absent trade
preferences schemes.
While the question of sustainability as approached in this Article is inherently qualitative, there are various factors that indicate a country's level of industrial sustainability. At
a macro-level, a good indicator is to look at whether an industry continues to perform at
the same level after trade preferences have been taken away, similarly, post-MFA phaseout or after the 2008 global financial crisis. At a micro-level, this Article will focus mainly
on five different categories that correlate with local sustainable industrial development.
These include (1) the level of product sophistication attained, as high product sophistica92
tion reflects higher value-added and lower demand elasticity than more basic products;
(2) transfer of skills to the local workforce, which indicates that a country is generating
domestic capability to be self-sufficient; (3) market and diversification, as this reduces dependency on a single export market/product and that market corresponding trade preference schemes; (4) the establishment of backward and forward linkages in the apparel and
textile value chain as they reduce a country's dependence on imported inputs; and (5) the
extent to which textile and apparel firms are locally owned or, if foreign owned, embedded
in the country in which it has invested. Strengthening one or all of these factors will make
a developing country less dependent on external factors like trade preferences, and less
vulnerable to global market fluctuations.

A.

LESOTHO

Trade preferences have enabled Lesotho to set up a major apparel export industry. But
most of Lesotho's apparel investment remains in the hands of foreign owners, reflecting
Lesotho's failure to build up a sustainable domestic apparel industry.
Lesotho began to build up its textile and apparel industry in 1980, when an influx of
Taiwanese investors relocated to Lesotho from South Africa, mainly to avoid political
90. BJUGGREN & LUNDSTROM, spra note 37, at 24.
91. Id. at 24-25.
92. Lawrence Edwards & Robert Z. Lawrence, supra note 34, at 4.
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sanctions that had been imposed in response to South Africa's Apartheid regime. 93 While
the total value of Lesotho's apparel industry was negligible in 1980, in 2008 it exceeded
94
$350 million, accounting for roughly 60 percent of Lesotho's total exports. These numbers mainly reflect the rapid growth that took place between 1996 and 2008, when
Lesotho's apparel industry grew more than 500 percent in response to unfilled quotas
under the MEA as well as trade preferences. 95
During the 1990s, increasingly more East Asian investors began to relocate to Lesotho,
attracted by the Lom6 Convention under which Lesotho's apparel products received dutyfree access to the European Union. While the Lom6 Convention had strict ROOs,
Lesotho received a temporary derogation from this requirement, 96 enabling apparel made
of third country fabric to be imported into the European Union duty-free.97 When this
derogation expired, Lesotho's exports to the European Union plummeted, as it was unable
to meet the Lom6 Convention's double transformation requirement. 98
In 2000, East Asian apparel investors relocated to Lesotho because of Lesotho's participation in AGOA. 99 These investors took advantage of Lesotho's status as a "lesser developed country," enabling the country to sell textile and apparel products duty- and quotafree to the United States, irrespective of the percentage of third country inputs. 0 0 As a
result, between 2000 and 2008, apparel firms in Lesotho increased from twenty-three to
seventy.' 0 ' In 2008, Lesotho and the European Union signed an EPA, allowing Lesotho
to get duty- and quota-free access to the European Union market through single transformation. Nevertheless, over 95 percent of Lesotho's apparel export continued to be
02
shipped to the United States.1
While trade preferences enabled Lesotho to attract foreign investment and grow its
apparel export industry, it has generated little horizontal or vertical diversification.103 Local sourcing continues to be low-between 5 and 15 percent-as the number of textile
production firms in Lesotho is negligible.104 Because East Asian investors were driven to
relocate to Lesotho mainly in order to take advantage of trade preferences, they transferred only basic manufacturing/CMT operations to Lesotho such as assembly, packaging
93. Id. at 10.
94. Karina Fernandez-Stark et al., The Apparel Global Value Chain: Economic Upgradingand Workforce Development, in SKILLS FOR UPGRADING: WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs 75, 109 (Gary Gereffi et al. eds., 2011).

95. Id.
96. Id. at 111 (citing ANDREW SALM ET AL., LESOTHO GARMENT INDUSTRY SUBSECTOR STUDY FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF LESOTHO 11 (2002)) (Lesotho applied for an exemption to the double transformation
requirement in the late 1980s, and received this exemption for a period of four years, which was renewed for
another four years.).
97. Edwards & Lawrence, supra note 34, at 10-11.

98. Id. at 11.
99. Fernandez-Stark et al., supra note 94, at 110-11.

100. Id. at 111.
101. CENT. BANK OF LESOTHO, AFRICA GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITIEs ACT (AGOA): ECONOMIC IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (2011), available at http://www.centralbank.org.1s/publications/Monthly-

EconomicReviews/2011/Econo_Reviewjune_20ll.pdf.

102. Cornelia Staritz & Mike Morris, Local Embeddedness, Upgrading and Skill Development: Global Value
Chains and Foreign Direct Investment in Lesotho's Apparel Industry 8 (Austrian Research Found. for Int'l Dev.
(OFSE), Working Paper No. 20, 2013).
103. Edwards & Lawrence, supra note 34, at 13.
104. Fernandez-Stark et al., supra note 94, at 111.
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and shipping services. 05 Activities that generate more value, such as input sourcing,
product development and design, merchandising and marketing, and logistics continue to
be managed from the Asian, (mainly Taiwanese) headquarters. 0 6 In addition, Taiwanese
firms have made little effort to train local workers to gain more advanced skills; a problem
that is aggravated by the fact that the common managerial language in Taiwanese-owned
factories in Lesotho tends to be Chinese. 0 7 As a result, benefits to the local economy
through vertical or horizontal spillovers from East Asian investment have been virtually
non-existent.1 08
An interesting shift took place with the influx of South African investors. While in
2000, thirty-four out of forty-two apparel firms were Asian, in 2011 South African firms
made up almost 50 percent of all apparel firms.1 09 In contrast to transnational Taiwanese
firms that were predominantly focused on "long production runs for U.S. customers,"11 0
South African investors' relocation decisions were mainly motivated by Lesotho's less
rigid labor rules, its lower-cost operating environment,111 and the introduction of dutyfree market access to South Africa under the South African Customs Union (SACU).112
Under SACU's Duty Credit Certificate (DCC)113 scheme, apparel and textile firms/exporters are eligible for duty rebates on imported apparel in SACU that would be re-exported outside SACU." 4 Different motives of South African investors compared to
Taiwanese investors have generated different opportunities for Lesotho's domestic industrial development."' In contrast to Taiwanese-owned firms, some degree of industrial
upgrading and local capacity building has taken place in South African-owned apparel
6
firms in Lesotho with some Lesotho employees occupying managerial positions."
Notwithstanding increased upgrading opportunities for employees in South African
firms, Lesotho's domestic apparel industry remains insignificant. Thirty years after
Lesotho opened its first apparel firm, only two local firms have been formally engaged in
apparel manufacturing.'? This may be explained in part by the fact that the Lesotho
government created incentives to attract foreign investors but did not extend these privileges to domestic investors. For example, benefits such as "cheap rents for preconstructed
factory shells . . . and a five-year tax holiday" were not extended to domestic investors.1 18
Similarly, the Central Bank of Lesotho provides financing opportunities for apparel ex105. Id.
106. Id. at 109.
107. Id. at 112.
108. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 17.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 109.
111. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 12.
112. Id. at 8. Countries that are part of SACU include: Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and
Swaziland.
113. While the DCC was terminated in 2005 as a result of VTO non-compliance, an interim extension was
put in place. Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 74, at 17.
114. Sean Woolfrey, TRALAC Hotseat Comment, MANUEL DE ARAUJo BLOC (Aug. 26, 2009), http://
manueldearaujo.blogspot.com; Staritz & Morris, supra note 102, at 1.
115. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 18.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 17.
118. HINH T. DINH ET AL., TALES FROM THE DEVELOPMENT FRONTIER:

How CHINA AND

COuNTRIEs HARNESS LIGHT MANUFACTURING TO CREATE JOBS AND PROSPERITY

OTHER

397 (2013).
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porters only, including credit guarantee assistance, more favorable domestic taxes, and a
reduced corporate tax to exporters exporting outside SACU (as well as a 10 percent reduction for those exporting within SACU).119
Failure to create a viable local apparel industry has made Lesotho highly dependent on
the continued existence of trade preferences.120 The expiration of the MFA in 2005 and
anticipated expiration of Lesotho's derogation of the double transformation rule led to the
closing of eight Taiwanese firms and layoff of 13,000 people, a quarter of total employment in the industry.1 2 1 While the consequences of the MFA phase out were buffered by
the imposition of safeguard measures on China's exports to the United States and the
European Union,1 22 the 2008 crisis and subsequent reduced apparel demand led to increased unemployment in Lesotho.1 23 This shock was exacerbated by the fact that, at the
24
time, 98 percent of all Lesotho's exports were destined for the United States.1

B.

KENYA

Historically, the textile and apparel industry has played an important role for Kenya.1 25
Import-substitution through heavy government protectionism post-independence enabled
Kenya's domestic textile and apparel industry to blossom, growing from six weaving mills
registered at independence in 1963, to fifty-two in mid-1980 and counting over 100 large27
26
The growth rate began to fall in the 1980s and 1990S.1
scale manufacturing units.1
However, export-oriented policies in the 1990s, in addition to trade preferences and the
MFA, helped revitalize Kenya's apparel export industry and helped Kenya become the
28
second largest apparel exporter to the United States.1
In the 1990s, Kenya began to create EPZs, which attracted foreign investors because of
the many benefits Kenya provided to EPZ investors, including: 100 percent investment
deductions, a ten year corporate income tax holiday;129 unrestricted foreign ownerships
and employment, freedom to repatriate unlimited amount of earnings; exemptions on
duty- and value-added taxes on imported raw materials and equipment; exemptions from
30
observing core labor laws and regulations; and freedom from exchange control.1
While these policies helped to expand Kenya's apparel industry, it was not until 2000,
when Kenya qualified for AGOA preferences, that growth was observed in its apparel
exports.131 From a total export value of $40 million in 1999, Kenyan apparel exports had
119. Id. at 400.
120. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 19.
121. Id. at 9.
122. Edwards & Lawrence, supra note 34, at 16.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 8.
125. RobertJ. Rolfe & Douglas P. Edward, Afican Apparel Exports, AGOA, and the Trade Preference Illusion, 5
GLOBAL EcON. J. 1, 10 (2005).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 10-11.
129. Id.
130. Rolfe & Edward, supra note 125, at 11.
131. Id. at 7.
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grown to $270 million in 2005,132 peaking in 2003 with forty apparel firms employing
roughly 37,000 people.133 All firms, with one exception, were foreign, mostly Asian, enterprises and were established after Kenya had qualified for AGOA in 2000.134 Almost all
export production happened in the EPZs.1 35 Prior to AGOA, Kenya was eligible for dutyand quota-free access to the European Union under the Cotonou Agreement upon meeting the double transformation requirement. Kenya's inability to meet these requirements
led to little increase in exports under Cotonou.1 36 While the Interim EPA changed this
requirement to single transformation, it did not drastically change trade volumes.137
When only focusing at increasing export volumes, Kenya qualifies as a success story.
Looking beyond the numbers, however, a less rosy picture emerges: despite AGOA preferences and Kenya's existing textile infrastructure, Kenya has been unable to establish a
38
viable domestic apparel and textile industry.'
Kenya's voluminous apparel exports hide the little domestic value that is added in Kenya per product, which is as low as 3 percent.1 39 This number reflects local contributions
such as packaging, or the use of Kenyan-made thread.1 40 The local value-added is so low,
in part, because almost all fabric-which constitutes the highest added value component
of garments-are imported from Asian suppliers, which are cheaper compared to Kenya's
inputs.141 In addition, most of Kenya's exported apparel products are lower-end, basic
commodity garments belonging to the commodity description "women and girls cotton
knit apparel" and "women's trousers," which require only minimal value-added.142 Thus,
the low unit value of Kenya's main apparel imports leaves little room for a higher domestic margin.
The majority of the apparel firms in Kenya's EPZ are foreign-owned and foreign managed. While some joint ventures with local firms exist, only one firm in Kenya's EPZ is
locally owned-and this firm primarily works as a subcontractor for foreign-owned
43
firms.1
Generally, foreign investors in Kenya have little stake in the future of Kenya's
apparel industry.1 44 As a result, only the most basic production elements in the apparel
value chain have been relocated to Kenya, while managerial decisions continue to be made
in the multinational's headquarters.14 Similarly, foreign nationals occupy most manage132.

PAUL COLLIER & ANTHONY

J.

VENABLES,

TRADE PREFERENCES AND MANUFACTURING EXPORT

14 (2007), http://users.ox.ac.uk/-econpco/research/pdfs/
TradePrefs-Manufacturing.pdf.
133. Kaplinsky & Wamae, supra note 59, at 7.
134. COLLIER & VENABLES, supra note 132, at 14.
135. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 8-9.
136. Kaplinsky & Wamae, supra note 59, at 7.
137. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 8-9.
138. Rolfe & Edward, supra note 125, at 10.
139. Id. at 18.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 19; Kaplinsky & Wamae, spra note 59, at 4, 7.
142. Kaplinsky & Wamae, supra note 59, at 7.
143. WORLD BANK, MAKING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT WORK FOR SUB-SAIARAN AFRICA: LOCAL
SPILLOVERS AND COMPETITIVENESS IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 230 (Thomas Farole & Deborah Winkler
eds., 2014)
144. Nicholas Phelps et al., Broken Chain?AGOA and Foreign DirectInvestment in the Kenyan Clothing Industry, 37 WORLD DEv. 314, 3 19-20.
145. Id. at 319.
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rial and technical positions, with high-skilled technical workers being imported mostly
46
from China and India.1
Unlike Lesotho, Kenya also has locally-owned apparel firms that operate outside the
EPZ.147 However, there exists practically no interaction between these firms and the foreign-owned firms in the EPZ.148 While the lack of linkages between these local firms and
foreign EPZ firms is caused by a myriad of factors, including different production standards and different end markets, it reflects Kenya's failure to incentive the creation of
linkages between EPZ firms and local firms. Indeed, the Kenyan government did not
establish a strategy for value chain integration and failed to create adequate incentives to
create a viable local textile and manufacturing industry.1 49 Instead, existing EPZ regulation hindered foreign-local firm integration. Firms in EPZs can sell only 20 percent of
total sales to domestic consumers in Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania (the East Africa Community members).so Moreover, any domestic customers are required to pay value-added
and import tax from products that come from Kenya's EPZs, further disincentivizing domestic (and regional) linkages.' Unsurprisingly, only 10 percent of their total sales have
taken place in Kenya, and only 5.9 percent of apparel companies in Kenya's EPZs export
52
to other African countries-compared to 73.7 percent of the non-apparel companies.1
Thus, existing regulation did not just extend tax and other benefits to foreign investors
only-it actively discouraged creating local linkages.
In addition, the Kenyan government decided not to revitalize its moribund textile industry, consisting of thirty-five dilapidated mills. 1 While government subsidies may not
have generated the most efficient outcome in this respect, private investment into the
textile industry in Kenya has also been difficult to attract, in part because of the high risks
involved in textile manufacturing in East Africa.ss
Relying almost exclusively on the export market, particularly the U.S. market, has made
Kenya highly vulnerable to the MFA phase-out and the 2008 crisis. While Kenya's exports did not drastically plummet immediately after the MFA phase-out (Kenya's exports
fell 5.1 percent compared with 26.2 percent for Madagascar), its economy proved much
less resilient to the phase-out a few years later compared to similarly situated SSA economies. 55 Post-2006, Kenya's clothing exports fell by 24.4 percent whereas clothing exports
by countries with more diversified end-markets, like Madagascar, increased by 7.6 percent. 5 6 Thus, Kenya has not managed to turn trade preferences-generated market access
into building a self-sustaining, domestic apparel industry.
146. Paul Kaman et al., Availability of Technical Skills in the Kenyan Clothing Industry and its Implications
on Competitiveness in the Post-MFA Era 13-14, 17 (June 24, 2013) (draft conference paper submitted for
presentation at the June 2014 UNU-WIDER L2C Conference in Helsinki, Finland), http://wwwl.wider.unu
.edu/L2Cconf/sites/default/files/L2CPapers/Kamau.pdf.
147. Farole & Winkler, spra note 143, at 230.
148. Id.
149. Phelps, supra note 144, at 322.
150. Farole & Winkler, spra note 143, at 233.
15 1. Id.
152. Rolfe & Edward, spra note 125, at 20.
153. Phelps, supra note 144, at 321.
154. Id.
155. Kaplinsky & Wamae, supra note 59, at 9.
156. Id.
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C.

MADAGASCAR1

71

57

Madagascar has had limited success in translating global export opportunities in the
apparel and textile sectors into a sustainable domestic industry.1 5 8 A combination of the
MEA, preferential trade tariffs to the European Union (and later to the United States
under AGOA), and host-country inducements like EPZs made Madagascar initially attractive to foreign investors, resulting in a boom of apparel exports.1 5 9 Madagascar's apparel
imports increased from $118 million in 1995, to $368 million in 2000, with 91 percent and
67 percent respectively destined to the European Union.1 60 During this time period, the
number of firms and employment opportunities similarly increased, from eight firms employing roughly 3,000 workers in 1990, to 150 firms employing almost 70,000 workers in

2000.161
The European Union has mainly been Madagascar's largest export market.1 62 Unlike
Lesotho and Kenya, Madagascar was able to meet the Cotonou Agreement's double transformation requirement by taking advantage of the Agreement's full cumulation provision,
which allowed imports from ACP countries to be counted towards the double transformation requirement.1 63 In Madagascar's case, the vertical integration of its apparel industry
with Mauritius-also an ACP country-enabled it to meet the double transformation requirement.1 64 In 2008, as part of a regional bloc, Madagascar signed an EPA interim
agreement with the European Union, which reduced ROOs requirements to single
transformation. 165
Qualifying for AGOA preferences in 2001 resulted in a significant increase in foreign
investment from Asia, mainly Hong Kong, China, and India, and a subsequent increase in
export volumes to the United States.1 66 In 1995, U.S. exports accounted for 6 percent of
Madagascar's total apparel exports, increasing to 31 percent in 2000 and 62 percent in
2004."167 But unlike Kenya and Lesotho, qualifying for AGOA did not divert all of Madagascar's apparel exports to the United States.1 68 Madagascar's strong linkages with the
European Union, as well as the E.U.'s relaxed rules of origin, enabled the country to build
up a significant export industry in both markets.
Madagascar also began exporting apparel products to South Africa, mainly as a result of
the duty elimination under SADC.1 69 Again, Madagascar was able to take advantage of
the elimination of duties, as vertical integration of its textile and apparel production with
157. See Staritz & Morris, spra note 102.
158. Id. at 10.
159. Id. The EPZs also contributed to this production increase. In 1988, Madagascar set up EPZs to attract
more FDJ. Firms located in EPZs are exempted from import and export duties, protected against depreciation, and have special access to foreign currency and unrestricted capital exchange controls.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 23; Bartels, spra note 89, at 749.
164. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 10.
165. Id. at 9.
166. Id. at 10.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 11.
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Mauritius enabled it to meet the double transformation requirement.1 70 Between 2006
and 2011, exports to South Africa rose from less than one million to over forty million.171
Madagascar's apparel industry is less volatile than Lesotho's and Kenya's analyzed supra,
which is in part caused by Madagascar's ability to attract a variety of apparel investors,
including some that are more embedded to the country. Initially, Madagascar's EPZs
attracted French investors because of historical and linguistic ties. Mauritian investors
followed, motivated by a combination of U.S. quota restrictions imposed on Mauritian
72
Asian investors came in the 1900s as a
imports, labor factors, and close proximity.1
result of preference-induced benefits.173 These dynamics resulted in a high variety of
apparel investors' nationalities in Madagascar's EPZ: in 2008, 29 percent of foreign investors in Madagascar's EPZ were French, 16 percent were Mauritian, 12 percent were Chi74
nese, and, notably, 20 percent of investors were comprised of local Malagasy firms.1
The various degrees of apparel firms' embeddedness in Madagascar demonstrates the
correlation between ownership and upgrading. For example, more innovation takes place
in Mauritian and Malagasy firms than in Asian firms in Madagascar.1 75 Unlike Asian investors, local and regionally-embedded firms have generally invested more in product upgrading, and some have specialized in high value-added items like cashmere pullovers as
well as hand-embroidered and smocked products.1 76 Despite the fact that not all firms
specialize in higher value products, the average unit value of Madagascar's apparel exports
77
is high compared to other SSA exported apparel products.
Despite these and other positive benefits, market access generated through trade preferences has not been a panacea. For example, rather than generating more backward linkages, it has accelerated the demise of Madagascar's cotton industry.1 78 While in 1980,
Madagascar had six textile mills-including state-owned firms-they could not compete
against cheaper inputs from Mauritius and Asia. Today, there is only one textile mill left,
9
which supplies between 15 and 25 percent of inputs for firms in the EPZs.17 European
and African firms tend to use local inputs in addition to regional inputs, whereas Asian
80
firms source nearly exclusively from Asia.'
Similar to Kenya and Lesotho, relatively few Malagasies occupy managerial or technical
positions in apparel firms.181 As government training initiatives are largely absent, training interventions have been left mainly to the private sector. While most foreign firms do
not invest in training and instead import foreign workers to occupy higher-level positions
in the firm, there are exceptions.1 82 For example, one Chinese firm has committed to
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

17.
11.
16.
10.
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MADE IN MADAGASCAR: THE IMPACT OF RULES OF ORIGIN ON THE TEXTILE

17 (2009), https://liveatlund.lu.se/intranets/LUSEM/NEK/mfs/MFS/193.pdf.
Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 20-2 1.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 24.
Id. at 25.
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training a Malagasy worker for every imported worker.8 3 In this firm, local merchandisers increased from one to twenty-two over the course of seven years. 8 4 In addition, the
international community has established a successful training program called Textile
Mada, which provides specialized training and generally assists firms to be more competitive.1 85 While these training programs are all a step in the right direction, they cannot
substitute large scale, government-funded training programs.
Madagascar lacks an industrial policy that balances attracting foreign investors with incentivizing domestic firms to enter the apparel industry. While it has some EPZ-related
export incentives in place, such as tax concessions, depreciation allowances, and special
access to foreign money, it has failed to implement relevant training programs for its
domestic workforce or provide access to finance programs for local entrepreneurs, which
is a major trade barrier in Madagascar.1 86 According to a World Bank study, only 3 percent of exporters in Madagascar have received a loan from a bank, compared to 70 percent
87
in Bangladesh and 64 percent in Mauritius.
Despite these and other shortcomings, Madagascar's export apparel industry has more
local ties compared to Lesotho and has-to a limited extent-proved to be more resilient
in the wake of crises. For example, as a result of diverse end markets, Madagascar was able
to significantly increase its overall apparel exports after the MFA phase-out in 2005, with a
7 percent increase in 2006 and a 20 percent increase in 2007.188 But the 2008 economic
crisis and the suspension of its AGOA status as a result of political turmoil resulted in a
significant decline in Malagasy apparel exports (with declines in 2009 and 2010 of 16
percent and 35 percent, respectively).189 The number of firms declined from 120 in 2005
to between sixty and seventy in 2012, with employment dropping from 100,000 to
55,000.190 While a suspension of AGOA benefits in a country like Kenya would probably
have even more dramatic effects, Madagascar's apparel industry was not sufficiently robust
to hold up in the wake of the triple crisis of political violence, the 2008 global financial
downturn, and the suspension of AGOA benefits.

D.

BANGLADESH

During the last forty years, Bangladesh has climbed to the top of apparel production,
becoming the world's second largest apparel producer with exports reaching a total of
thirteen billion in 2009.191 Bangladesh built up its industry from scratch, aided by trade
preferences and government policies incentivizing local entrepreneurship and backward
linkages.192
183. Id.

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 10, 14, 25.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
UNCTAD & COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, POTENTIAL SUPPLY CHAINS IN THE TEXTILES AND

SECTOR IN SOUTH ASIA: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 27 (2009), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
ditctncd2011d3_en.pdf; accord. GEREFFI & MEMEDOVIC, supra note 46, at 27.
192. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 43.
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Motivated by the MFA, preference schemes in the European Union, as well as domestic
policy, Bangladesh became a platform for East Asian-mainly Korean-apparel producers. 193 Bangladesh flourished under the MFA because it was subject to less restrictive
import quotas compared to China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan.1 94 As a result, it attracted East Asian apparel investors-mainly from the Republic of Korea-that helped
build up Bangladesh's apparel industry.1 95 Bangladesh was also attractive because of its
LDC status, which enabled it to qualify for the E.U.'s EBA, providing duty- and quotafree access to the European Union, subject to a double transformation requirement.1 96 In
contrast, Bangladesh did not benefit from trade preferences because the only scheme it
was subject to was the U.S. GSP program-which excludes most textile and apparel products. 197 As a result, by the mid-1990s more than 50 percent of Bangladesh's total apparel
98
The establishment of two major EPZs that genexports went to the European Union.1
99
erated special benefits for exporters boosted Bangladesh's apparel exports.1
Bangladesh was able to engage in significant industrial upgrading. Whereas in the
1990s the majority of Bangladesh's apparel firms mainly engaged in CMT, most apparel
firms located in Bangladesh evolved into full-package production, including sourcing and
financing inputs, production services, and packing. 200 Bangladesh was able to shift into
the OEM stage mainly because it had managed to build up a domestic textile industry for
knitted products, thus generating backward linkages.201
The Bangladeshi government began subsidizing local textile production in an attempt
to reduce dependency on textile imports and to meet the E.U.'s double transformation
requirement. These subsidies included cash handouts to export-oriented firms using locally-produced inputs, subsidized interest rates, and reduced infrastructural costs for local
textile firms.202 In addition, until 2005, FDI in Bangladesh was conditional upon investing in backward linkages.203 These policies generated local entry into the textile and apparel industry. Out of 4,220 apparel and textile firms in 2006, only eighty-three were
wholly or partially foreign-owned. 204 As a result, in 2008 about 25 percent of Bangladesh's textile inputs were sourced locally.205
Bangladesh was able to make this shift to domestic ownership mainly because of the
policies it adopted encouraging skill transfer and lowering investment barriers for local
entrepreneurs in the apparel and textile sector. For example, until 2005 FDI was only
allowed in EPZs, and on the condition that the firm made investments in Bangladeshi
193. Id.
194. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 109.
195. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 213.
196. Id. at 237-38.
197. Id. at 238.
198. Id. at 215.
199. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 34.
200. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 222.
201. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 35.
202. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 240-41.
203. Id. at 221.
204. Id.
205. Meenu Tewari, Deepening IntraregionalTrade and Investment in South Asia: The Case of the Textiles and
Clothing Industry 7 (Indian Council for Research on Int'l Econ. Relations, Working Paper No. 213, 2008),
http://icrier.org/pdf/WorkingPaper_2 13.pdf.
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backward linkage industries. 206 Thus, rather than undermining their growth, the presence
of foreign investors gave a boost to domestic textile firms. Moreover, Bangladesh provided production incentives not only to foreign investors, but also to local entrepreneurs. 207 For example, Bangladesh significantly reduced entry barriers into the apparel
manufacturing industry by initiating a bonded warehousing system, which allowed a local
208
garment exporter to import fabric with deferred payments until sales were finalized.
Because textile comprised around 75 percent of the total value-added of a garment and
209
was mostly imported, these policies were critical in enabling a local garment industry.
In tandem with these policies, the Bangladeshi government also actively invested in
formal workforce development programs. Toward the end of the 1980s, as a result of
foreign donor initiatives and two private Bangladeshi industry associations, foreign investors in EPZs began to pay more attention to systematic skills training. 210 The government launched specific skill training programs through the creation of technical and
vocational institutions. 2 11 The flagship of these programs is PROGRESS, the Promotion
of Social, Environmental, and Production Standards, which is jointly sponsored by the
2 12
German and Bangladeshi government.
Bangladesh managed to build a relatively sustainable apparel industry with strong local
ties to make it sustainable. As a result, during the post-MFA phase-out Bangladesh's exports did not diminish, but almost doubled (from $6.2 billion in 2004 to roughly $12
billion in 2007).213 Similarly, the 2008 global crisis resulted in an increase in Bangladesh's
share of global textile and apparel exports, with a 20.4 percent increase in 2008 and a 5.4
percent increase in 2009, mainly because Bangladesh was not solely dependent on the
214
United States but also had strong export linkages with the European Union.

E.

SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka's experience in the textile and apparel value chain stands out as it has achieved
some of South East Asia's highest design and quality standards. 2 15 Prior to economic
liberalization in 1977, Sri Lanka had "few locally owned [apparel] firms," all of which
"produced . . . low-end apparel for the domestic market." 2 16 In 1977, Sri Lanka began to
attract foreign investment in the apparel sector, predominantly from East Asia and the
European Union. 217 East Asian investors were mainly seeking to invest in Sri Lanka be206. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 221. These restrictions were later removed, but there is no evidence that significant FDJ is taken place outside the EPZs.
207. Tewarisupranote 205, at 49. The Bangladeshi government also provided incentives to fuel the growth
of the apparel industry. While not setting up an EPZ, Bangladesh lowered import tariffs from 65 percent to
30 percent, and also allowed for duty-free imports for products that would be re-exported.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 35.
211. Id. at 36.
212. Id. at 37.
213. Tewari,mpra note 205, at 7.
214. Frederick & Staritz, supra note 1, at 219.
215. Id. at 455.
216. Id. at 442.
217. Id.
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cause of the MFA, while European investors were attracted by Sri Lanka's liberal investment climate.218
Similar to Bangladesh, the Sri Lankan government adopted policies to facilitate the
transfer of knowledge from foreign investors to domestic firms. For example, businesses
incorporated as joint ventures with foreigners received special tax reductions. 2 19 This allowed for a high level of skill transfer to take place between foreign and local entities. In
addition, it incentivized local companies to work together with foreigners: upon reaching
a certain minimum amount of foreign investment, a local company would receive tax exemptions on income for a period of five years. 220 As a result, "in 1999, around 80-85
percent of apparel factories in Sri Lanka were locally owned." 221 Local firms began to
dominate the sector in the early 1990s, and by 2000, 80 to 85 percent of apparel firms
222
were locally owned.
Textile and apparel investment thrived between 1999 and 2004, almost doubling the
total value of Sri Lanka's initial apparel exports. 223 In 2001, apparel exports to the European Union increased after Sri Lanka qualified for quota-free-but not duty-free-access
under the GSP, subject to a double transformation requirement. 224 Sri Lanka was also
eligible for trade preferences under the U.S. GSP, but these covered only a small percentage of Sri Lanka's apparel imports. Because Sri Lanka did not have a well-developed
domestic textile industry, its utilization rate of the E.U.'s GSP was only around 40 percent, and its use of GSP preference schemes to the United States was negligible. 225 This
changed in 2005 when Sri Lanka became the first South Asian country to qualify for E.U.
GSP+, allowing for duty-free market access in addition to quota-free access and removing
the double transformation requirement. 226 As a result, Sri Lanka's share of apparel exports to the European Union increased from 33 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in 2009,
while exports to the United States decreased from 62 percent in 2000 to 36 percent in
2009.227
While the initial investments in Sri Lanka consisted mainly of CMT operations, Sri
Lanka has engaged in significant product and functional upgrading-going from basic to
sophisticated products, and from apparel manufacturing to apparel design, respectively.228
Sri Lanka has moved away from producing basics like knitwear and T-shirts to higher
value products for niche markets like intricate embroidery, stich embellishment, and highquality, eco-friendly garments. 229 Investing in these high-end products for niche markets
218. Id.
219. Id. at 442-43.
220. Ananda. Jayawickrama & Shandre Thangavelu, ASEAN+1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in East Asia:
The Case of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sri Lanka, in ASEAN+1 FTAs AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN
EAST ASIA 232, 251 (C. Findlay ed., 2011).
221. Staritz & Frederick, supra note 1, at 449.
222. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 28.
223. Staritz & Frederick, supra note 1, at 443 (explaining that apparel exports increased from $1,680 million
in 1999 to $2,975 million in 2004).
224. Id. at 167.
225. Jayawickrama & Thangavelu, spra note 220, at 253.
226. Staritz & Frederick, supra note 1, at 167.
227. Id. at 451.
228. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 29.
229. Kanchana N. Ruwanpura & Neil Wrigley, The Costs of Compliance?: Views of Sri Lankan Apparel Manufacturers in Times of Global Economic Crisis, 11 J. EcON. GEOGRAPHY 1, 6 (2010).
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has given Sri Lanka the reputation as "lingerie capital", supplying to firms like Victoria's
Secret and Marks and Spencer. 2 30 It has also made the unit values of Sri Lanka's garment
exports amongst the highest in the region. Between 2000 and 2008, many firms shifted
from producing 80 percent of their total output of low-value added products, to 50 per23
cent constituting higher value-added items. 1
Sri Lanka's upgrading success has transformed the country into a sourcing hub. Large
Sri Lankan apparel manufacturers have established factories in Africa and developed backward linkages with India and Bangladesh.232 Sri Lanka has been able to establish some
backward linkages to its local economy, with 40 to 50 percent of knit fabric being locally
produced. 2 33 All woven fabric, however, is imported, amounting to an average of 65 per234
cent of all textile inputs.
Sri Lanka's success can be attributed to two main factors: early moving advantage that
created strong ties with major international buyers like Nike and Victoria's Secret, and
proactive government policies in the wake of the MFA phase-out. 2 35 In 2002, the government and the private sector established the Joint Apparel Associations Forum (JAAF),
which, after identifying weaknesses in the apparel industry, produced an industry-wide
response to growth in the apparel sector in its Five-Year Plan. 236 The key objectives of the
Five-Year Plan included increasing industry turnover to $4.65 billion in 2007; transforming industry from a "manufacturer" to a provider of "fully integrated services"; focusing
on high-value apparel instead of apparel high in low-costs; creating an international reputation in niche markets: sportswear, casual wear, children's wear, and intimate apparel; and
consolidating and strengthening the industry.2 37 Another key element of the Five-Year
Plan focused on human resource development through initiatives to increase workers'
productivity and technical competence through training programs in areas such as market2 38
ing and design.
While significant upgrading has taken place in Sri Lanka, the apparel industry remains
heavily dependent on the United States and the European Union as its main export markets. This is in spite of the existence of South Asian regional agreements, such as the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and an India-Sir Lanka free trade
agreement, which maintain high tariff and quota barriers on intra-regional trade. 239 As a
result, despite its sustainable local industry, Sri Lanka was still heavily impacted by the
global economic crisis in 2008 and the phasing out of safeguards imposed on China toward the end of 2008. In 2009, apparel exports decreased by 7.3 percent, mainly as a
result of a decrease in United States exports. 24 0 Export earnings dropped by 15 per230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 30.
Id. at 28.
Staritz & Frederick, supra note 1, at 457.
Id. at 456.
Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 29-30.
Yevgeniya Savchenko, The Rise of Small Asian Economies in the Apparel Industiy, in

SEWING SUCCESS?

EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND POVERTY FOLLOWING THE END OF THE MULTI-FIBRE ARRANGEMENT

163,

176 (Gladys Lopez Acevedo & Raymond Robertson eds., 2012).
237. Id. at 172.
238. Id. at 173.
239. Staritz & Frederick, supra note 1, at 460-61.
240. Id. at 443.

SUMMER 2015

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
78

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

cent.2 41 Another challenge came from the European Union when it decided to cut Sri
Lanka's GSP+ benefits in response to shortcomings with respect to its human rights record. 242 Thus, while the creation of Sri Lanka's apparel industry has been highly successful, it was-almost inevitably-affected by the global economic downturn and its
subsequent consequences.

CAMBODIA

F.

While Cambodia engaged in apparel manufacturing during the French Colonial era, its
modern apparel industry was set up only in the mid-1990s.

2 43

Between 1995 and 2000, its

apparel industry grew from $63 million to $2,434 million, making apparel the country's
largest export sector. 244 This growth was the result of Cambodia's preferential market
access, the MFA, and Cambodia's export-oriented industrial policy.
In 1999, Cambodia and the United States signed the U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile
Agreement (UCTA), which provided Cambodia preferential market access for apparel
products. 245 A unique feature of the UCTA was the Better Factories Cambodia Program,
under which Cambodia would receive an increase in import quotas to the United States if
246
it could demonstrate compliance with its labor laws and international labor standards.
Cambodia also benefited from quota- and duty-free market access to the European Union
under the EU's GSP program, and later the EBA, subject to a double transformation
requirement. 247 Failure to establish backward linkages in Cambodia resulted in a utilization rate of GSP preferences of a mere 10 percent. 248 Preferential market access to the
United States was not conditioned on meeting double-transformation. As a result, the
United States became Cambodia's largest export market for apparel, peaking in 1999 at a
249
share of 87.7 percent and 70 percent in 2008, employing roughly 325,000 workers."
Industrial upgrading in Cambodia has been largely absent. Seventy percent of Cambodia's apparel exports are CMT, the lowest stage of the apparel value chain, and almost all
fabric is imported. 25 0 Cambodia's apparel industry suffers from a lack of competitiveness,
as most of the equipment used is primitive and often second-hand. 2 51 This poor record in
creating more value-added is caused in part by the fact that around 93 percent of
Cambodian-based apparel factories are foreign-owned, led by Taiwan, China, and Hong
Kong, with foreigners making up a majority of factory managers. 2 52 Cambodians own
only 7 percent of apparel firms, which are mostly smaller factories. 253 Foreign ownership
and management control has not facilitated knowledge sharing and participation of local
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 447.
Id.
Savchenko, spra note 236, at 176.
Staritz & Frederick, supra note 1, at 249.
Id.
Savchenko, spra note 236, at 187.
Staritz & Frederick, supra note 1, at 267-68.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 163.
Savchencko, spra note 236, at 163, 181-82.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 75, 170, 255-56.
Id. at 256.
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employees in strategic decision-making.2 5 4 According to a survey conducted of 164 garment firms in Cambodia, 30 percent of all managers came from China, followed by 21
25 5
percent from Taiwan, 15 percent from Hong Kong, and only 8 percent from Cambodia.
Similarly, Cambodia has failed to establish backward linkages, importing over 90 percent
25 6
of textile inputs.
Cambodia's industrial policy, or lack thereof, has contributed to these unsustainable
dynamics. In contrast to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the Cambodian government only
focused on attracting FDI-not local businesses-to build up its apparel industry. For
example, in 1994 "it approved the establishment of 100 percent foreign-owned firms in
Cambodia." 25 7 In addition, foreign exporters are eligible for duty-free imports and other
tax reductions for which local firms are ineligible.258 Meanwhile, training programs to
allow for upgrading are largely absent, with only two formal training institutions in
place. 25 9 And while the government prepared a post-MFA transition strategy entitled the
"Cambodian Garment Industry Development Strategy," this strategy was never
implemented.260
Cambodia's failure to build up a local apparel industry made it particularly vulnerable to
the 2008 financial crisis that took place simultaneously with the phase-out on China's
safeguard.261 In 2009, total apparel exports declined by 14.1 percent, and seventy-two
factories closed in 2009, with the remaining 241 factories operating at 60 to 70 percent of
26 2
capacity, laying-off 20 percent of the workforce.

VI.

A.

Implications
RULES OF ORIGIN Do NoT

AUTOMATICALLY

LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A

VIABLE LocAL APPAREL INDUSTRY

The contrasting experiences of the six countries analyzed supra demonstrate that while
trade preferences enable developing countries to increase apparel exports, they do not
automatically lead a developing country onto a path of sustainable industrial growth. All
six countries studied were able to generate significant volumes of apparel and textile exports, in part as a result of trade preferences. AGOA was a critical enabler for Kenya,
Lesotho and Madagascar, the UCTA for Cambodia, and the EBA and GSP+ programs for
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. When preference programs were taken away-as we saw in
the case of Sri Lanka and Madagascar-exports plummeted significantly. This demonstrates that trade preference programs have been, and continue to be, critical enablers for
developing countries to become players in the trade and apparel value chain and partake in
the benefits of globalization. Yet, from all six countries studied, only Madagascar, Sri
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
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Id. at 256.
Savchenko, supra note 236, at 74, 171.
Id. at 173.
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Id. at 176.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 253

262. Savchenko, supra note 236, at 253; UNCTAD Secretariat, Integration of developing countries in global

supply chains, including through adding value to their exports, U.N. Doc TD/B/C./16, at 18 (Mar. 25, 2011).
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Lanka, and Bangladesh stand out as having been relatively successful in establishing a
viable domestic industry, thereby capturing more local benefits, while Kenya, Lesotho,
and Cambodia, generally, have not. Thus, preferences alone, while increasing exports, do
not automatically generate significant, local, economic benefits for the exporting country.
The case studies also demonstrate that more flexible ROOs do not necessarily correlate
with higher levels of sustainable, domestic industrial development. Rather, they generate
higher preference utilization rates but also tend to create higher levels of vulnerability and
dependency on export markets. For example, Cambodia qualified for both U.S. and E.U.
preferences, but its utilization rate of E.U. preferences was only 10 percent.2 63 As a result,
almost 90 percent of Cambodia's exports went to the United States, which, unlike the
European Union, did not require double transformation.264 More importantly, more flexible ROOs have not facilitated sustainable growth in Cambodia's apparel industry.
Rather, it is more closely linked with EPZ-concentrated growth, input dependency, and
little or no vertical upgrading and skill transfer taking place.
Conversely, the case studies show that the countries that generated more local valueadded, i.e., Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Madagascar, did not necessarily benefit from flexible ROOs. Madagascar grew its industry by taking advantage of the full cumulation option of the E.U.'s Cotonou Agreement, using textile imports from Mauritius to fulfill the
double transformation requirement. Bangladesh was able to meet the E.U.'s preference
program's double transformation requirement through backward linkages spurred by domestic textile production investments. 265 Sri Lanka grew its industry in the 1990s despite
only being able to take advantage of GSP preferences at that time. Nevertheless, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh not only managed to foster their apparel industry, they
were also able to generate significant domestic value capture by creating varying degrees
of sustainable local growth.
It would be too easy, however, to conclude that less flexible rules of origin always result
in more local value-added. While flexible ROOs make trade preferences accessible to
low-income countries that do not have the capacity, they tend to trap low-income developing countries in lower echelons of the apparel value chain. On the other hand, stricter
ROOs remain inaccessible for developing countries with little production capacity, thus
precluding access to trade preferences for these countries and the opportunity to build up
a sustainable apparel industry there from. For example, had Cambodia not benefited from
relaxed ROOs, it would likely not have attracted FDI and would not have been able to
build up an apparel and textile export industry.
As this Article will demonstrate below, ROOs represent only one factor that influences
the industrial dynamics of developing countries and certainly do not determine the viability
of a country's growth path. Irrespective of ROOs, developing countries have a choice and
can determine the long-term viability of their growth path through developing a proactive
industrial government policy that balances attracting FDI with incentivizing local enterprises to enter the garment industry.
263. Savchencko, supra note 236, at 268.
264. Id.; Jayawickrama & Thangavelu, supra note 220, at 253.
265. Kazi. N. Ahmed, Changes in the Rules of Oigin of EU-GSP Scheme & Bangladesh's RMG Indus., 1 FOR.
Ave. INSIGHTS & Rs. [FAIR] 1, 2 (2012), http://www.academia.edu/3785264/Changes in the Rules of Ori
gin.ofEU-GSPSchemeandBangladeshsRMGIndustry.
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PRO-ACTIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY

In the context of global value chains, an industrial strategy that is not solely exportoriented is key in generating domestic value. 266 The case studies above demonstrate that
the countries that have been least successful in establishing sustainable apparel industries,
i.e., Kenya, Cambodia, and Lesotho, all had industrial policies in place that were exclusively oriented toward attracting foreign investors to produce goods almost exclusively for
the export market. Some regulation even went as far as to discourage creating local
linkages.
For example, the Kenyan government focused exclusively on building up a viable export-oriented industry, providing tax exemptions, 100 percent investment deductions, and
freedom from exchange control to exporters in the EPZs, resulting in almost 100 percent
foreign-ownership in the EPZs. 267 Meanwhile, Kenya failed to provide incentives for local and/or regional apparel manufactures, having established almost no training programs
and no strategy to generate backward linkages through its dormant textile industry. In
addition, while Kenya benefited from the existence of local apparel enterprises, its EPZ
regulation explicitly discouraged linkages between foreign and local enterprises by capping the percentage of total sales that could be sold locally and regionally, as well as by
subjecting any local sales to an import and sales tax. Similarly, the Lesotho government
adopted an export-oriented industrial strategy, incentivizing foreign investors through
visa requirements waivers, EPZs, tax holidays, and cheap rents-benefits that were not
extended to domestic investors. 268 The Lesotho government also provided credit guarantee assistance to exporters and reduced corporate taxes for those exporting outside of
SACU-and to a lesser extent to those exporting within SACU-with no programs in
place to train workers or help local investors gain financial credit or become exporters.
Cambodia's industrial policy in the apparel and textile sector similarly focuses solely on
providing incentives to foreign investors through tax exemptions, EPZ benefits, and other
incentives. It even passed a law allowing for 100 percent foreign-owned firms in Cambodia. 269 Meanwhile, like Kenya and Lesotho, incentives for local firms have been largely
absent, as are training programs for workers, an industrial upgrading strategy, or a nicheproduct focus.
In contrast to Kenya, Cambodia, and Lesotho, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh-the two
countries that have been relatively successful in generating viable domestic apparel industries-have each implemented strong governmental policies that focus on encouraging
participation of local enterprises in the textile and apparel sector in addition to attracting
FD. For example, Bangladesh set up EPZs with accompanying tax exemptions to attract
foreign investment, but until 2005, foreign investment in EPZs was made conditional on
investing in backward linkages in Bangladesh.270 This facilitated skill transfer and provided a boost to Bangladesh's domestic textile industry. Furthermore, Bangladesh invested heavily in financing programs that reduced entry barriers for local apparel firms,
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
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which proved critical to attract local investors.271 Bangladesh facilitated the growth of its
textile industry through subsidies, including cash handouts to export-oriented firms using
locally-produced inputs, subsidized interest rates, and reduced infrastructural costs for local textile firms.272 Finally, the Bangladeshi government actively engaged in training its
workforce through programs like PROGRESS.273
Similarly, Sri Lanka's success in establishing a viable domestic apparel industry has been
the result of an industrial strategy that focused on how to engage foreign investment to
best incentivize domestic apparel production. 274 For example, Sri Lanka provided fiscal
incentives to both domestic and foreign investors: businesses incorporated as joint ventures with local investors received special tax reductions. 275 In addition, it created a FiveYear Plan setting out Sri Lanka's way to become a full-service provider of high-apparel
products, focusing on training of the workforce, niche-product development, and worker
productivity. 276 This strategy proved highly successful and facilitated exceptional levels of
277
upgrading.
Thus, these case studies lend themselves to the conclusion that a country's industrial
strategy determines in part whether it will embark on a path of sustainable development in
the textile and apparel sector, or whether preference-induced growth will remain merely
ephemeral.

C.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EMBEDDEDNESS

All six case studies demonstrate that firm embeddedness is a precondition for sustainable industrial development. 278 Embeddedness, in the context of global value chains, refers
to the extent to which firms and owners of firms are enmeshed in local relationshipS 279 or
"have roots in the social and economic fabric of the host country." 280 Embeddedness
correlates strongly with ownership: firms with local or regional ownership are more embedded in the host-country than transnational firms.281
Kenya, Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, Lesotho, demonstrate the difficulty of building up a sustainable textile and apparel industry while relying mainly on foreign investment with a short-term vision. Multinational investors, attracted by trade preferences,
tend to outsource only low value-added manufacturing operations. They restrictively
control technological know-how and other high-information segments of the value chain,
and tend not to invest in workforce-training programs. This dynamic makes one developing country easily replaceable with another, and does not, without proactive government
interference, lead to local industrial linkages, process or product upgrading, or workforce
training.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
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This dynamic is fundamentally different for foreign firms that have regional ties to the
country in which they invest, the contrast of which is well illustrated by Lesotho's experience with Taiwanese transnational firms and South African investors. 2 82 While practically
no upgrading took place in Taiwanese firms, South African investment provided opportunities for locals to occupy managerial positions in the value chain and allowed for some
upgrading. 28 3 South African firms are more invested in the future of Lesotho's apparel
industry, in part because of proximity and strong ties between the South African and
Lesotho markets. 284 Similarly, in Madagascar, local firms owned by longstanding French
residents and Mauritians engaged in more innovation and industrial upgrading than their
285
Asian counterparts.
Regional integration as demonstrated by Madagascar and South Africa has also proven
to make a country less vulnerable to external market shocks. 286 For example, Bangladesh
was able to increase its share in global textile and apparel exports by 20.4 percent in 2008
and 5.4 percent in 2009, mainly because of its vibrant export market to the European
Union. 287 Similarly, Madagascar was able to withstand the effect of the MFA phase-out.
While Madagascar's exports significantly dropped in 2005, a year later they increased by
7.6 percent. 2 88 This was mainly the result of an increase in exports to the European
Union and South Africa.

VII.

Policy Options

This section analyzes industrial policy options for developing countries that aim to use
trade preferences to grow their textile and apparel export industry while generating sustainable local growth. The policy options are divided in three different levels: first, and
most importantly, the national level at which governments can implement an industrial
policy strategy that is not just export-oriented; second, the regional level at which regional
blocs can cooperate to gain more value-added from apparel and textile trade; and third,
the international level at which developed countries can engage in strategies that will directly contribute to developing countries' level of sustainability, beyond focusing on expanding the scope of preference programs. Because each developing country has a unique
set of political, legal, historical and economic parameters, industrial policy options and
opportunities must necessarily be tailored to the specific situation of each individual country. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the policy options presented in this Article
provide a mere overview of possibilities for developing countries and should not be considered blueprints for industrial upgrading.

282. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 4.
283. Id. at 25.
284. Id. at 8.
285. Id. at 4, 28.
286. Id. at 19.
287. Savchencko, spra note 236, at 219.
288. Kaplinsky & Wamae, supra note 59, at 10.

SUMMER 2015

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

84

A.

NATIONAL LEVEL

As clearly demonstrated by the case studies presented in this Article, an industrial policy
that goes beyond focusing on export markets is critical in determining the sustainability of
a developing country's textile and apparel industry. International and regional trade and
investment agreements have set up parameters limiting and defining the scope of a country's industrial policy space. Within this context, this section provides an overview of
some policy options that a government may want to consider when aiming to establish
viable domestic apparel industries.
1.

Encourage the Development of Local Production

Given the correlation between local embeddedness and industrial upgrading, governments should adopt policies that encourage the development of local production while
incentivizing foreign investment. This includes policies that lower entry barriers for local
entrepreneurs, provide similar incentives to foreign and local investors, and create structural incentives to encourage foreign-local cooperation.
First, in order to encourage local textile and/or apparel producers, governments should
lower entry barriers for local entrepreneurs. One way to do so is by providing access to
low-cost and long-term financing, including accepting alternative forms of collateral.
This is illustrated by Bangladesh's bonded-warehouse system, which allows local producers to import fabric with deferred payments until after sales are finalized.289 As 75 percent
of the products are inputs that have to be imported, the bonded-warehouse system makes
it possible for entrepreneurs to set up businesses with only 25 percent of the capital.
Second, governments should facilitate access to credit for foreign and domestic exporters, or exports destined to a market other than the United States or the European Union.
Another way would be to enable local firms to use export-credit facilities, which could
help these firms meet the costs associated with exporting to E.U. or U.S. markets, such as
costs involved in conforming to market requirements. 29 0 The absence of credit facilities
has proven to be a real obstacle in Madagascar, where only 3 percent of exporters report
having received a bank loan, compared to 70 percent in Bangladesh.291
Third, a government should try to balance promoting foreign and domestic investment. 292 At a minimum, and as demonstrated by Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, this should
involve applying the same incentives provided to foreign investors in EPZs to local
29 3
firms.
While extending tax exemptions to local business could deprive the government
of much-needed tax revenues, extending these benefits only to local business that meet
certain minimum requirements will minimize the cut in the tax revenue.
289. Savchencko, supra note 236, at 215.
290. Christopher Onyango & Moses Ikiara, Reflections on Kenya's Experience Under AGOA: Opportunitiesand
Challenges, in IMPROVING AGOA: TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR U.S.-AFRICA COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT

25, 26, 34 (Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/

files/reports/2011/6/01%20improving%20agoa/0601_improving-agoa.pdf.
291. Staritz & Morris, spra note 102, at 14.
292. Id. at 6-7.
293. Jayawickrama & Thangavelu,

spra note 220, at 253.
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Fourth, local firms can be promoted by establishing structures that encourage collaboration between foreign suppliers and local firms.294 Especially in some African countries,
firms in EPZs are disconnected from the value chain and only marginally integrated with
local firms.295 This is the result of EPZ-specific policies that tend to see the EPZ as a
separate ecosystem. 296 Instead, countries should promote interaction between EPZs and
local firms by encouraging local investment in EPZs, the transfer of domestic labor to the
EPZs, and the use of domestic inputs. 29 7 Sri Lanka has successfully encouraged such linkages by providing tax reductions to joint ventures between foreign and local firms, while
Bangladesh has done so by making foreign investment conditional on establishing local
29 8
linkages and local input.
While keeping these options in mind, it is important to note that domestic content
requirements for goods are not allowed under the WTO's Trade Related Investment
299
Measures (TRIMS) Agreement, in addition to some bilateral investment agreements.
This would mean that requiring inputs to be supplied from domestic enterprises as a condition for investment would not be in line with the TRIMS Agreement. 30 0 In practice,
governments can avoid WTO-inconsistency by attaching incentives to the use of local
inputs rather than requiring a percentage by law. Local content restrictions under
TRIMS do not extent to services and employment, unless they are prohibited through
commitments made in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This means
that governments are legally allowed under the WTO to include local content provisions
to maximize local employment opportunities. This may include provisions that require,
all else being equal, priority given to nationals when recruiting workers, or provisions that
specify percentage targets for local nationals, differentiated by category of employment
(e.g., unskilled labor, and managerial positions), or through featuring on-the-job training
30
requirements, including through minimum annual financial commitments. 1
Whatever methods are employed, it is worth pointing out that a government should
aim to balance policies that stimulate promoting the domestic industry with those that
attract foreign investors. If policies are collectively so cumbersome that they offset market
advantages, foreign investors may look to invest in countries with less burdensome regulations, such as Cambodia, which allows 100 percent foreign ownership without conditions
attached.
2.

Incentivize the Creation of Backward Linkages

Another way for developing countries to proactively engage in industrial upgrading and
move towards a sustainable apparel industry is through policies that support backward
294. John Page, Can Africa Industrialise?,21 J. AFR. EcON. AERC SUPP. 86, 115-18 (2012), http://jae.oxford
journals.org/content/2 1/suppl_2/ii86.full.pdf+html.
295. Id. at 118.
296. Id. at 116.
297. Id.
298. Savchencko, supra note 236, at 221, 442-43.
299. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex LA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
300. Id.
301. LORENZO COTULA, INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 47-48 (2010).
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302
Bangladesh was able to upgrade from CMT to fulllinkages, whether local or regional.
packaging supply mainly because of its textile industry, while Sri Lanka developed backward linkages with regional textile industries in India and Bangladesh, which ultimately
30 3
facilitated upgrading.

Whether a country is attempting to revive a defunct textile industry, like Kenya, or
build a new one based on domestic cotton production, the development of a vibrant textile
industry generally requires significant investment-either from the government or the private sector. 304 In Bangladesh, the government subsidized the textile industry by providing
305
electricity reductions, support on land, infrastructure, and interest rates.
Another way to create backward linkages is through incentivizing local sourcing. For
example, Bangladesh provides a 25 percent cash incentive to apparel firms that use locallyproduced inputs in their exports. 30 6 Yet another way to do this would be through encouraging better regulation of the textile industry and by setting up an apex organization to
coordinate between garment and textile producers and the private and public sector. 307 As
demonstrated by Kenya's failure to regenerate its dormant textile mills, a coordinated
body that oversees seed quality and pesticides and provides a credit-system is critical for
308
well-functioning textile industry.
For many developing countries, creating a textile base may be infeasible or an undesirable use of public resources given the cost. Some have even questioned whether Bangladesh's heavily subsidized textile production presents a desirable model for selfsufficiency, given the facts that Bangladesh lacks a cotton base and the costs of capital are
high while scales of operation are low. While a domestic textile base may be unfeasible,
Sri Lanka and Madagascar provide examples that strong linkage with regional textile suppliers can also lead to industrial upgrading. In Madagascar, vertical integration with Mauritius has resulted in the closure of all but one of Madagascar's textile mills, yet the
alternative of a heavily subsidized and uncompetitive domestic textile industry may not
have been a sustainable strategy either. While backward linkages are a feature of a wellintegrated industrial base, the extent to which a country should invest its resources is
heavily dependent on country-specific factors.
3.

Promote Product and Process Upgrading

Governments also need to encourage industrial upgrading, including both product and
process upgrading. They can do this by setting up specific skill-training programs, identifying new niche areas/products to develop, and through advertising and marketing these
new products.
Product upgrading requires investment technology as well as an industry-wide promotion strategy. For example, Sri Lanka in its Five-Year Plan set out a deliberate and comprehensive strategy for moving from a manufacturing hub to becoming a provider of fully
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
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integrated services. More specifically, Sri Lanka shifted away from undifferentiated commodities like knitwear and T-shirts to higher value production for niche markets like intricate embroidery and stitch embellishment, and is known as the world's "lingerie
capital."309 Madagascar has also managed to establish niche expertise in embroidery and
stitching, allowing modest product upgrading. In Madagascar's case, however, this upgrading was less of a result of government policy than of private strategy. Other examples
of potential specialty products would include investing in organic or environmentallyfriendly products (made from organic cotton or environmentally-friendly cotton
varieties).

310

Conscious consumption of a country's specialty products needs to be promoted, requiring investment in product innovation, branding developments, and the cultivation of markets and buyers for different niche products. 311 Developing countries could increase
visibility of their specialties by creating organizations to promote their wares. 312 Again,
Sri Lanka is exemplary in this regard.
A skill gap poses a major constraint to industrial upgrading. As such, for a developing
country to successfully stimulate industrial upgrading in apparel, it is imperative to invest
in basic education as well as specific skill training in technical and soft skills.313 Training
programs need to be developed to train the local workforce to gain managerial and supervisory skills in lines of Bangladesh's PROGRESS, but also to teach the workforce skills
3
beyond CMT manufacturing, such as design and marketing. 14
One potential downside of investing in high-value apparel is that it could decrease employment as the industry consolidates and becomes more skill-oriented, requiring less labor at the lower echelons of the value chain. Again, developing country governments will
have to consider their specific needs and capabilities in order to determine what strategy
will be most beneficial for the development of a dynamic, domestic apparel industry.

B.

REGIONAL

LEVEL

Beyond their borders, developing countries should focus on creating stronger regional
linkages, including both more intraregional investment and more vertical production linkages. These intraregional ties are critical to long-term sustainability because the resulting
investments are generally more embedded and the diversification of end markets reduces
3 15
foreign market dependency.
309. Ruwanpura & Wrigley, supra note 229, at 6.
310. Moses M. Ikiara & Lydia K. Ndirangu, Developing a Revival Strategy for the Kenyan Cotton-Textile Industry: A Value Chain Approach, 85 (KIPPRA, Working Paper No. 8, 2003).
311. PETER GIBBON & STEFANO PoNTE, TRADING DowTN: AFRICA, VALUE CHAINS, AND THE GLOBAL

EcONOMY (2005).
312. Id.
313. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 23-24; Page, supra note 294, at 109.
314. Fernandez-Stark, supra note 94, at 37.
315. A study by UNCTAD (2010c) supports the conclusion that "exports from Asian LDCs to other
oping countries-which are mostly their neighboring countries-are higher in factor intensity," thus
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Currently, intraregional trade in SSA and South Asia is marginal at best. 3 16 Madagascar
only began to export to South Africa when SADC reduced duties on imports from SADC
countries and, similarly, Lesotho only began to export to South Africa after receiving a
derogation on the SADC import tax. Sri Lanka, despite being part of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), exports less than one percent of its total
apparel exports to South Asia. 317 In Kenya, only 10 percent of total sales took place in
Kenya, and only 5.9 percent of apparel companies in EPZs exported to other African
countries, compared to 73.7 percent for non-apparel exports. 318 Almost all of Cambodia's
exports go to the U.S. market.
These low figures in intraregional trade can be explained by a number of factors. The
small share of Lesotho's exports to South Africa was a result of SACU's high import
tariffs. Lesotho and South Africa began to engage in apparel trade only after SACU introduced the Duty Credit Certificate, which provided a duty drawback scheme for imported
clothing based on their export value.319 Prior to this scheme, it was, ironically, cheaper to
import textile and apparel to the United States under AGOA than to members of SACU
as textile and apparel imports were subjected to a tariff of 40 percent. 320 Similarly, intraregional trade in SAARC or under Sri Lanka's bilateral trade agreement with India is
limited because of high tariff and quota restrictions that continue to be in place on textile
and apparel goods. Furthermore, government policies extend more favorable tax exemptions to products traded outside of SSA regions than within. For example, the Central
Bank of Lesotho provides credit guarantee assistance, more favorable domestic taxes, and
a reduced corporate tax only to exporters exporting outside SACU, with only a 10 percent
32
tax reduction for those exporting within SACU. 1
Developing countries that belong to an already established regional network may consider creating economic and political incentives to lower trade barriers and foster a greater
volume of intraregional trade. At a minimum, developing countries should advocate for
tariff reductions on textile and apparel products traded regionally and provide for more
flexible ROOs. As long as regional import duties on textile and apparel are less favorable
than preferences provided by the European Union or the United States, it will be very
challenging to boost intraregional trade and create more industrial embeddedness.
Regional ties should also be fostered in generating vertical integration. For example,
Africa has a large supply of cotton. Instead of importing all inputs from Asia, better regional cooperation could have Tanzania and Uganda supply cotton to Kenya, which has a
comparative advantage in ginning the cotton given its history. 32 2 Alternatively, there
should be more vertical arrangements such as exist between Madagascar and Mauritius, or
Sri Lanka and India, whereby inputs are supplied by a trusted regional supplier, generating stronger regional linkages and enhancing industrial embeddedness.
Incentives to truly lower barriers in intraregional trade in many of the regions studied
are lacking despite lofty aspirations and agreements. This is in part motivated by domestic
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Savchencko, spra note 236, at 451-52.
Id.
Rolfe & Woodward, supra note 125, at 20.
Woolfrey, spra, note 114.
Edwards & Lawrence, supra note 34, at 11.
DINH, supra note 118, at 400.
Phelps et al., spra note 144, at 322.
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opposition from industry, as lowering intraregional trade barriers exposes the textile and
apparel industry to increased competition from the region, which could significantly hurt
a domestic industry, as was the case in Madagascar, which had to close most of its textile
mills in part because of cheaper inputs from Mauritius.

323

Similar reasons motivated Ban-

gladesh's opposition to the EU's proposal to relax its ROOs and allow for regional cumulation to count toward the double transformation requirement. The Bangladeshi textile
producers that worried about increased competition were the ones that led the opposition.
The difficulty to truly create free regional trading blocs in East Asia and SSA reflects
remnants of the earlier debate between liberalists and protectionists. But as tariff barriers
have been removed globally, failure to do so locally-despite some anticipated sectorspecific losses-will keep the nascent apparel and textile industry in developing countries
heavily dependent on developed countries' trade preferences and export market conditions. As such, countries are encouraged to lower intraregional trade barriers in apparel
and textile through existing agreements like SADC and SAARC, and also through negotiating new agreements such as the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement between three of Africa's regional blocs (SADC, COMESA, and EAC)324 based on the mutual understanding
that increased intraregional trade is imperative to building up a dynamic and sustainable
apparel and textile industry in the region.

C.

INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Trade preferences and their accompanying ROOs are not sufficient for a developing
country to embark on a path of sustainable economic development. Yet, as demonstrated
by the case studies, they are critical to the future of the apparel industry in many developing countries. Madagascar and Sri Lanka illustrate that preferences, when taken away, can
significantly reduce apparel exports, thereby decreasing a country's options of building up
a sustainable apparel industry. Thus, developed countries should continue to give out
trade preferences to developing countries and, where possible, lower restrictive ROOs
requirements to enable a larger number of developing countries to utilize the preferences.
However, this Article has demonstrated that trade preferences per se do not provide
incentives to developing countries to build up a viable domestic industry. The focus of the
international community with respect to ROOs should reflect this. While this does not
call for a change in preference programs-preferences programs have been and continue
to be a key catalyst for market access in the apparel sector-it instead calls for a comprehensive dialogue that recognizes that without complementary and balanced industrial policy, the preferences will not help a developing country to sustainable growth. The
international community should begin to focus on how, if at all, it can best assist developing country governments build up sustainable domestic apparel industries.
One way to do so would be through starting consultation sessions with government
officials and the private sectors in preference-receiving countries. For example, countries
eligible to receive trade preferences could be required to present a strategic industrial plan
to the preference-giving country or international organization like UNCTAD, which
323. Staritz & Morris, supra note 102, at 23.
324. Affica's Largest Free Trade Area Set to Launch in December, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE
DEv. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/africaE2%80%99s-largest-freetrade-area-set-to-launch-in-december.
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would provide feedback on the plan's sustainability for purposes of domestic value creation, as well on the compliance of some of the proposed policies with international standards. In doing so, developing countries should be encouraged to collaborate with
economists who can help identify dormant comparative advantages and engage in a dialogue with the private sector to increase their understanding of both the opportunities for
rapid growth and regulatory and other bottlenecks. Preference-extending governments
could facilitate such strategic thinking and planning through, for example, expanding on
initiatives such as the USAID Trade Hubs. Under this initiative, some AGOA beneficiaries received help in developing National Investment and Export Strategies designed to
identify comparative advantages and market gaps in order to boost exports under
AGOA.325 While this is a start, it would be imperative for such advisory hubs to alter
their focus from being exclusively export-oriented to comprehensive and balanced industrial policy engagement that include incentivizing domestic growth. While these initiatives may not have any direct effects on a country's industrial policy absent enforcement
mechanisms, they will, at a minimum, encourage government officials to think about the
long-term consequences of the industrial policy they have (or do not have) in place.
Additionally, the international community could support and motivate efforts to assist
developing countries to establish the institutions or mechanisms that will help generate
local entrepreneurship in the apparel sector. One way to do this is to support industry
specific skill-training programs like Bangladesh's PROGRESS, or assist a country to set
up a credit rebate system as Bangladesh has done through their bonded-warehouse system.
In addition to funding some of these initiatives, the international community could also tie
trade preferences eligibility to demonstrating the existence of training programs for the
workforce, in light of the Better Factories Cambodia trade agreement.
Finally, as demonstrated by this Article, the link between market access and industrial
policy is tenuous at best. The international community should start to think about a new
model that consciously links market access, whether enabled through trade preferences,
trade agreements or bilateral investment treaties, to a country's industrial focus and strategy and, as a result, allows developing countries to gain more local economic benefits
from trade. What exactly such a framework should look like has to be explored in another
Article, but at a minimum, the international community should be open to consider alternative models of trade and development.

VIII.

Conclusion

This Article has demonstrated that trade preferences alone are insufficient to determine
whether developing countries will translate access to the textile and apparel value chain
into the development of a sustainable local apparel industry. The six countries studied all
developed their export industries in part as a result of trade preferences, most of them
from both the European Union and the United States. When solely looking at apparel
export volumes, these countries are all success stories. Yet while preferences delivered in
increasing trade, they did not in all cases generate development. At most, three of the six
countries studied-Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Madagascar-may be considered to have
325.
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been (relatively) successful in translating the opportunity into local industrial development, while Lesotho, Cambodia, and Kenya have remained stuck at lower levels of valueadded and industrial upgrading. While trade preferences are an enabler, factors like firm
embeddedness, regional integration, and proactive industrial policies that balance a focus
on developing an export-industry with establishing a domestic apparel basis have proven
to be imperative in dictating a country's level of sustainable apparel development.
Based on these findings, this Article has put forth policy options for preference-receiving countries to consider. At a national level, developing country governments should aim
to adopt a balanced industrial strategy that, in addition to encouraging foreign investment,
reduces access barriers for local apparel producers and entrepreneurs, encourages backward linkages-either domestic or regional, strengthens public-private cooperation, and
follows a strategy to engage in industrial upgrading and development of expertise in niche
products. At a regional level, it is critical for developing countries to create stronger linkages and promote intraregional trade and investment flows. Lowering intraregional tariff
barriers and cumbersome ROOs would be a prerequisite to accomplish this. At an international level, it is important to maintain trade preferences with flexible ROOs, but to
recognize that they are not a panacea for sustainable development. The international
community could do more to communicate this message and to provide assistance to developing countries by providing them with feedback on their strategic plans in addition to
program-specific development assistance.
Balancing export-oriented programs and programs that incentivize local firms to participate in the apparel and textile value chain may not be easy to achieve. This is in part
because of the inherent tension between short-term gains, which stem from an outwardlooking economy, and long-term economic gain. Encouraging local ownership through
making tax benefits conditional on creating a joint venture with a local firm may generate
more industrial sustainability but may also drive away foreign investors who think such
conditions may hurt their profit margins. This is especially the case when investors have
options: when foreign investors are motivated by little more than trade preferences and
cheap labor, and one developing country's manufacturing sector is undifferentiated from
another, alternatives are easily found. In other words, developing countries need to engage in a careful balancing act between policies that attract foreign investors and policies
that encourage the development of the local industry, as a shift too far to either side could
upset the balance and risk losing everything.
Moreover, not all proposed policies will provide direct gains for a country's domestic
apparel industry, and some may even result in losses. For example, increased regional
integration results in more competition and may lead to closure of textile mills that are
uncompetitive compared to textile inputs from a regional country. The same can happen
for manufactured products: if imported apparel products are cheaper than apparel goods
produced in the importing country, the apparel industry in that country will become uncompetitive. Again, here we see that measures that could lead to more sustainability in a
country's apparel sector could simultaneously hurt the domestic apparel industry.
This problem goes to the heart of the earlier debate of liberalism versus protectionism.
Liberal measures-exemplified by trade preferences with unrestrictive ROOs-provide a
country with few industrial capabilities trading opportunities they otherwise would not
have. This boosts the local economy by leading to an increase in GDP and by providing
employment. Nevertheless, as the domestic apparel industry in many developing counSUMMER 2015
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tries has not been able to reach levels at which it can compete internationally, open borders do not automatically stimulate the development of a country's local industry, and may
even undermine it. To avoid total dependency on international markets, developing countries are encouraged to engage in an industrial strategy that proactively stimulates domestic apparel industries while continuing to attract foreign investment-a balanced industrial
policy.
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